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Executive summary 
This study presents an empirical analysis of the resilience of European countries to the 
financial and economic crisis that started in 2007.1 The analysis addresses the following 
questions: Which countries showed a resilient behaviour during and after the crisis? Is 
resilience related only to the economic dimension? Has any of the EU countries been able 
to use the crisis as an opportunity and 'bounce forward'? Is it possible to identify any 
particular country characteristics linked to resilience?  
The analysis is based on the JRC conceptual framework for resilience (Manca et al., 2017) 
which places at its core the wellbeing of individuals, thus going beyond the merely 
economic growth perspective.  
The study carefully selects a number of key economic and social variables that aim 
to capture the resilience capacities of our society. Resilience is measured by investigating 
the dynamic response of these variables to the crisis in the short and medium run. In 
particular, we define four resilience indicators: the impact of the crisis, the recovery, 
the medium-run, and the ‘bouncing forward’.  
Results from a narrow exercise focusing on macroeconomic and financial variables confirm 
the validity of the proposed measurement approach: Germany appears to be among 
the most resilient countries; Ireland, after having been severely hit, shows a good 
absorptive capacity; Italy seems to be still struggling with the recovery, while Greece 
remains the most affected. 
After measuring resilience, we identify underlying country characteristics that may be 
associated with resilient behaviour. As such, these could indicate entry points for 
policies to increase countries' resilience to economic and financial shocks. 
The exercise has led to the following results and conclusions. 
- Ranking countries according to their resilience is not trivial. Their resilience 
performance depends on the indicator of reference: countries that are more 
resilient in their short-term response may not necessarily be the ones 
that perform better in the medium term. For example, while Germany and 
Poland appear to be among the most resilient countries both in the short and 
medium run, Bulgaria and the Baltics score better in the medium run than in 
the short run.  
- Broadening the perspective from a purely economic to a socio-economic 
viewpoint has an impact on the resilience assessment of a number of 
countries. For instance, Bulgaria proves more resilient when social variables 
such as social exclusion, happiness, health expenditures and wages are included 
in the analysis. Conversely, Hungary becomes less resilient when the social 
dimension is factored in. The importance of this broader perspective further 
reinforces the case for the European Pillar of Social Rights, and for the 
inclusion of the social dimension in the work of the European Semester. 
- We assess whether countries have been overall able to 'bounce forward', i.e. 
to improve their situation compared to the pre-crisis period. Countries' 
1 We work under the simplified assumption that the crisis can be viewed as a common exogenous shock that 
hit all EU countries at the same time. Resilience then also encompasses domestic imbalances that have been 
built up and that one can view as vulnerabilities, e.g. the fiscal situation, private sector indebtedness, housing 
bubble, banking sector and current account imbalances. 
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performance in this respect is substantially heterogeneous: while Croatia, 
Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Spain still lag behind their pre-crisis performance 
in the majority of relevant socio-economic dimensions, countries like Germany 
and Malta managed to bounce forward in many areas.  
- In most countries, active labour market measures, productivity and R&D 
expenditures have increased compared to their pre-crisis level. Countries have 
been generally able to 'bounce forward' more as far as monetary 
aspects of wellbeing (GDP, consumption and income) are concerned, 
compared to non-monetary aspects of wellbeing (e.g. happiness, inequality, 
social exclusion and the share of young people not in employment, nor 
education, nor training). This latter finding confirms the need to consider the 
social dimension. 
- The analysis tested over 200 candidate characteristics for their association with 
resilience. Relevant country characteristics can differ in their association with 
short- and medium-run resilience. In particular: 
- High values of pre-crisis government expenditures on social protection 
turn out to be the most important feature in predicting the country absorptive 
capacity (lower impact). 2  
- When focusing on the medium run, the countries performing better are those 
that exhibit higher political stability. 
- As for the capacity of countries to ‘bounce forward’, what becomes critical is the 
business environment and in particular the perception of wages being 
related to productivity. 
- More generally, data show that countries that are net creditors vis-`a-vis the 
rest of the world tend to be more resilient than net debtors in all dimensions 
analyzed. 
 
 
 
                                           
2  The significant role of expenditures on social protection is in line with results obtained in a previous JRC 
analysis on the quality of life. 
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1 The policy context 
Resilience is a key concept in the current narrative for the European Union (EU). Interest 
in resilience has been rising rapidly during the last twenty years, as a response to 
increasing uneasiness about potential shocks that would test the limits of the coping 
capacities of individuals, regions, countries and institutions, and that we cannot hope to 
eliminate (e.g. digital innovation, demographic change, climate change, globalization or 
immigration). They are the “new normal”. 
In the Rome Declaration of 2017, the EU institutions and Member States (MS) clearly stated 
that the goal is to "…. make the EU stronger and more resilient, through even greater unity 
and solidarity amongst us and the respect of common rules". 
Similarly, the reflection paper on Harnessing Globalisation3 calls for domestic policies that 
“boost our resilience at home”. It stresses the importance of social, tax and education 
policies to ensure resilience, as well as strong and competitive economies that can finance 
a fair re-distribution of wealth. By the same token, the Joint Communication "A Strategic 
Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action"4 emphasizes that a strategic and 
political approach for external policies will help increasing resilience inside the EU. It speaks 
of resilience as “a broad concept encompassing all individuals and the whole of society” 
that features “democracy, trust in institutions and sustainable development, and the 
capacity to reform”. 
Most often, the concept of resilience is considered from an economic perspective. In March 
2017, the G20 adopted a list of principles to strengthen economic resilience and policies.5 
In September 2017, the Eurogroup started thematic discussions on enhancing economic 
resilience in the EMU, in the context of the growth and jobs agenda (European Commission, 
2017). A similar focus on economics has dominated the significant efforts undertaken by 
other international organisations in this area, such as the OECD,6 the International 
Monetary Found (2016) or the ECB.7 
However, it is also more often recognized that understanding and building resilience 
requires taking a broader perspective and considering society as a whole. Such a ‘system 
view’ should encapsulate the entire production process of societal well-being, to ensure 
that not only economic, but natural, social and environmental resources are also harnessed 
in an efficient, sustainable, fair and responsible manner. 
While the discussion on resilience has started in several policy fora, there is still no 
commonly agreed definition, nor a unified approach towards its measurement. It is 
therefore no surprise that resilience has not yet become an overarching policy objective.  
In 2015, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the European Political Strategy Centre started 
a common reflection on resilience and established a Commission-wide network to discuss 
resilience in the policy context.8 This effort led the JRC to a notion of resilience that focuses 
on individual well-being, and to a framework for its assessment and measurement (Manca 
                                           
3  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-globalisation_en.pdf 
4  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/2017-joint-communication-strategic-approach-resilience-eus-external-
action_en 
5  http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Schlaglichter/G20-
2016/Note-Resilience-Principles-in-Economie.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
6  These include Duval and Vogel (2008), Caldera-Sanchez et al. (2016), Sutherland and Hoeller (2014).  
7  These include European Central Bank (2016) and Sondermann (2016). 
8  Commission-wide Research Network on Measuring Resilience, Resil.net. 
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et al. (2017)). The JRC framework is particularly suitable for policy design, and comes at 
a time when citizens' concerns call for strong policy actions. Indeed, our society is 
constantly hit by shocks of various types and at the same time is facing long-term 
challenges. Financial and economic crisis, migration, terrorism, globalization, Brexit are 
key examples. 
The present study builds on the JRC resilience framework and assesses the response of EU 
Member States to the 2007-2012 global financial and economic crisis, addressing the 
following questions. Which countries showed a resilient behaviour during and after the 
crisis? Is resilience related only to the economic dimension? Has any of the EU countries 
been able to use the crisis as an opportunity and 'bounce forward'? Is it possible to identify 
any particular country characteristics linked to a more resilient behaviour? 
The financial and economic crisis originated in the US in 2007 and shortly became a full-
blown economic crisis, known as the Great Recession. By 2010, the crisis and the economic 
downturn developed into a sovereign crisis in some vulnerable EU countries. The severe 
recession reflected in a drop of the EU-28 real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by as much 
as 4.4% in 2009, with its unemployment rate peaking at 11% in 2013. Unlike in the US, 
where the real GDP has surpassed its pre-crisis level by 2011, the recovery was quite 
sluggish in the EU, with the 2016 real GDP of 10 Member States still being below their 
2007 level. 
Such a coexistence of financial, economic and sovereign crises offers an unprecedented 
'social experiment' for assessing the resilience of socio-economic systems. Indeed, one can 
reasonably assume that the European crisis originated from a common exogenous shock, 
which impacted the whole continent. At the same time, owing to the different structural 
vulnerabilities of the various EU countries, the shock amplified to various degrees across 
EU countries, which in turn reacted differently based on their socio-economic 
characteristics. This offers a unique natural experiment for the study of resilience. 
By exploiting the variation in the responses of Member States to the shock, we are able to 
assess their resilience. For example, the steadily rising employment rate in Germany 
throughout the crisis (from 73% in 2007 to 79% in 2016) contributes to its characterization 
as a particularly resilient country. Conversely, as an example from the opposite end of the 
spectrum, one may take the stagnant economy of Italy, where average real GDP growth 
was -0.6% between 2006 and 2016, against 0.7% for the EU28.  
The dynamic perspective of our measurement approach also allows for distinguishing 
short-term from medium-term resilience, and identifying those countries that have been 
rather heavily hit, but have also been able to recover quite well. Lithuania, where the 
unemployment rate rose to more than 18% in 2010, but is now down to 7%, is one such 
country. 
Our proposed methodology for the measurement of resilience yields very reasonable 
results when applied to strictly economic and financial indicators. We also expand our focus 
to the socio-economic system as a whole, by including in the analysis indicators which 
relate to all parts of the system, in particular to social and human capital, institutions and 
infrastructures, as well as 'beyond GDP' measures of prosperity and well-being, covering 
social aspects such as health and poverty. Finally, we study the underlying factors that are 
associated with resilient behaviour. 
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2 Resilience: how to interpret and measure it 
2.1 The JRC conceptual framework 
According to the JRC framework (Manca et al. (2017)), a resilient system (or society) can 
face shocks and persistent structural changes in such a way that it does not lose its ability 
to deliver societal well-being in a sustainable way (i.e., deliver current societal well-being, 
without compromising that of future generations). 
The link between this definition of resilience and the concept of sustainability is very close. 
Nevertheless, if sustainability is the goal to be reached, resilience is the means to remain 
on or return to a sustainable development path of a complex system in the presence of 
distress. 
We have identified three different capacities that make societies resilient, depending on 
the interaction between the time of exposure and the intensity of distress.  
As shown in the left panel of Figure 1, when both the persistence and intensity of a shock 
are relatively low, the optimal coping strategy is that of absorption, without significant 
changes in behaviour. For example, when considering the individual-level shock of a job 
loss, the absorptive capacity would consist of relying on government transfers or private 
savings to face the initial period of unemployment. 
As either the intensity, the persistence of distress, or both increase, some degree of 
flexibility and a change in behaviour are required to allow the system to function without 
major disruptions. This adaptive capacity, when applied to our previous example, could 
involve relying on different strategies such as reducing consumption or taking on 
temporary jobs of lesser qualification requirements.    
Ultimately, as the distress becomes unbearable, the degree of flexibility required for the 
system to continue functioning necessitates a major change or transformation. This 
transformative capacity requires learning from past events and implementing changes 
ideally towards a better development path, given the current constraints.  
It is important to note that these capacities are by no means mutually exclusive. In fact, 
the boundaries between absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities are rather 
blurred, and the way a certain response to a shock can be interpreted naturally depends 
on the way the system is defined, as well as on the time horizon, risk aversion, performance 
metrics etc. considered. This implies that both the resilience strategies themselves, as well 
as their ranking and desirability are to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.   
The conceptual framework of resilience presents additional key elements. It focuses on 
individuals, takes a societal perspective, and considers individual and societal well-being 
as the ultimate goal. In this concept, societal well-being does not simply amount to the 
sum of individual well-being, but also includes aspects related to the structure and fabric 
of society, such as community values or social capital.  
The framework breaks the silos of thematic approaches, and looks at the socio-economic-
environmental nexus as a whole. This approach, or system view, distinguishes three 
elements of the system. (i) Assets include various forms of human, social, natural and built 
capital. (ii) Outcomes represent determinants of individual well-being (e.g. health, 
employment, trust and happiness), consumption, investment, as well as some adverse 
systemic fallouts (e.g. social exclusion, poverty, inequality, waste in general). (iii) The 
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engine transforms assets into outcomes through societal institutions and processes such 
as governments, markets, enterprises, or communities. 
The right panel of Figure 1 shows a schematic visualization of the system view, building on 
the “materially closed Earth system” model by Costanza et al. (1997). The system view 
allows measuring resilience by assessing how shocks impact the various components of 
our society.  
Figure 1 Shocks and capacities (left). Ingredients of resilience in the materially closed Earth system 
(right). 
 
  
By taking a dynamic perspective, the JRC framework fits the policy needs. Having identified 
the resilience capacities of absorption, adaptation and transformation, it allows for a 
formulation of different types of policy interventions in a structured way. While none of 
these would be adequate in all situations, well-targeted policies tailored to specific needs 
and in support of specific resilience capacities have a great chance to succeed. The creation 
of a safety net in the Banking Union is an example of prevention but also preparation 
measures, which aim at reducing the incidence and size of damages, in this case as a 
consequence of the financial crisis.  
Protection measures are required to mitigate their impact, and to provide relief from 
potential deprivation or a loss of the standard of living. For example, unemployment 
benefits act as an (income) buffer, supporting the standard of living for a time period 
sufficient to find a new job and to recover a suitable income. This provision becomes crucial 
for individuals that cannot rely on their own savings.  
While protection aims at supporting absorptive capacities (stability), promotion measures 
serve to invoke the adaptive capacity (flexibility) necessary to cope with more persistent 
and/or severe distress. Investment in innovation, flexible labour market policies, vocational 
training for the unemployed are all examples of promotion measures. Finally, 
transformative measures may be required to deal with acute distress. They typically 
correspond to a learning process. The shift towards a Genuine Financial Union (starting 
with the Capital Market Union) as a consequence of a persistent financial crisis is an 
example.  
The conceptual framework also puts forward the idea that shocks should be considered as 
windows of opportunity, and utilized to “bounce forward”. Policy-makers, for their part, 
should assist in providing citizens with the right means to benefit from such opportunities. 
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Annex 1 lists the main definitions introduced in the conceptual framework and used in the 
report. 
 
2.2 Measurement strategy 
The conceptual framework for resilience, with its system view, is the basis for 
operationalizing resilience for policy and monitoring purposes. Due to the complex and 
multidimensional nature of the concept, the idea is to place ‘resilience sensors’ on 
observable system variables corresponding to assets, to the ecological, institutional and 
socio-economic functionalities of the engine, and finally to outcomes. These sensors would 
then be able to track the behaviour of various entities, such as people, communities, cities, 
regions or countries. 
Given that resilience is related to the dynamic response of a system to disturbances, its 
direct monitoring would require a continuous re-assessment of such responses. For 
example, one would need to re-estimate how the unemployment rate responds to new 
shocks. In the absence of new shocks every year, this continuous assessment would not 
be possible. Moreover, such dynamic responses (e.g., how unemployment responds to 
shocks) would not provide direct guidance on how policies can foster resilience, or how a 
system would deal with unknown future disturbances.  
The alternative we propose is to identify resilience characteristics, i.e. features that 
differentiate resilient entities (individuals, communities, cities, regions or countries) from 
non-resilient ones. These characteristics are meant to be indicative of an entity’s 
fundamental ability to respond to disturbances in general. Thus, they are different from 
the specific policies and actions taken during an actual period of distress. They can be 
monitored on a regular basis and used to build a dashboard. 
Resilience characteristics can be identified by the following steps: 
1) Collect data on relevant system variables for assessing the resilience of various 
entities to various shocks and slow-burn processes (defined as long-run changes and 
stress). 
2) Build resilience indicators, which quantify the dynamic response of a system to the 
shocks of interest. These indicators would measure, for example, how long it took for 
an economy to recover, or the magnitude of the consequences of the shock. 
3) Identify resilience characteristics, i.e. factors that prove to be influential and robust 
determinants of resilience, as measured by the multitude of indicators derived in the 
previous step.  
Such a dashboard of resilience characteristics offers entry points for policy 
interventions and lends itself to multiple applications to support the full policy cycle, i.e. 
the monitoring, designing, implementing and assessment of policies. In particular, it 
- allows for a continuous monitoring of socio-economic resilience within the EU,   
- helps assessing the intended or unintended consequences of specific policies,  
- serves as a guide for identifying and implementing resilience-enhancing 
structural reforms,    
- facilitates the design and evaluation of societal stress tests.  
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3 Measuring resilience to the financial and economic crisis 
3.1 System variables 
To analyse Member States’ response to the crisis and assess their resilience, we focus on 
potentially relevant systemic variables from the socio-economic domain. We first selected 
a list of approximately 100 variables from various existing indicator sets,9 and then 
restricted our sample to those with sufficient data coverage both in the cross-section and 
over time. Our final set consists of 34 system variables, including both objective and 
subjective (i.e., opinion survey-based) ones. 
The choice of these variables is guided by our conceptual framework. The first objective is 
to span the entire socio-economic-institutional system in a balanced way, and select 
variables that adequately describe each part of the system. Second, the selected variables 
need to exhibit a substantial variation in the wake of the crisis. Finally, we put emphasis 
on the determinants of individual and societal well-being, often going “beyond GDP”.  
Table 1 provides a list of the variables we include in the analysis. It distinguishes between 
a set of core-economic and financial variables and a set of non-core variables, i.e. social 
variables as well as economic variables that link comparatively more to the social sphere. 
Though some variables are related to each other by construction (like GDP and 
investment), their observed dynamic behaviour are typically quite different. Table 1 also 
shows how we classify these variables into assets, engine and outcomes, according to the 
system view.10 Table 4 in Annex 2 provides details on the variables considered, including 
their definition, data source and time span.
Table 1: List of system variables. 
 ASSETS ENGINE OUTCOMES 
CORE - Investment 
- Government deficit 
- Government debt 
- Household loans 
- House prices 
- Inflation 
- Labour productivity 
- Corporate loans 
- Private debt 
- Stock prices 
- Employment rate 
- Gross Domestic Product 
- Unemployment rate 
NON-
CORE 
- Dwellings 
- Expenditures on 
education 
- Expenditures on 
health 
- Fairness 
- Trust in people 
- Social activity 
- Trust in European Parliament 
- Trust in legal system 
- Expenditures on active and on 
passive labour market programs 
- Expenditures on R&D 
- Incidence of temporary work 
- Wages 
- Happiness 
- Health 
- Household consumption 
- Income inequality 
- Not in employment, education 
or training (NEET) 
- Social exclusion 
- Household income 
- Satisfaction 
                                           
9  E.g. Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure indicators, EU 2020, Sustainable Development Indicators, 
Employment and Social Policy indicators, Social Pillar indicators, and ingredients of Quality of Life. 
10  For some of the variables, there is some ambiguity in their mapping to the system. This is particularly true 
about some variables that we have allocated to assets, as data on various capital stocks is more difficult to 
obtain. The main objective was to ensure that no major part of the system is left uncovered. 
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3.2 Resilience indicators 
Starting from the variables described in the previous section, we derive the following 
resilience metrics by suitably transforming the raw data: (i) impact of the crisis, (ii) 
recovery from the crisis, (iii) medium-run performance, and (iv) bounce forward. The 
metrics are computed by assuming that the crisis was a single, common episode hitting all 
Member States in 2007.  
This is clearly a simplifying assumption. Though the global financial crisis undoubtedly 
originated in the US and hit Europe as an exogenous shock, the degree to which each 
European country was exposed and vulnerable to this common shock varied, depending on 
some structural features of the countries. When it comes to the actual measurement of 
resilience, one could work with the assumption that countries were hit by shocks of different 
magnitude. Unfortunately, we cannot adopt this interpretation, as the magnitude of the 
shocks would be difficult to pin down. Rather, we simply acknowledge that a less vulnerable 
country will appear to be also more resilient, particularly in the early, crisis impact phase. 
Reducing a country’s vulnerability is therefore tantamount to increasing its absorptive 
capacity. Certain resilience characteristics, however, might be more naturally linked to 
vulnerability or absorption, offering some separation of the two from each other. 
Based on the above interpretation, we compare countries' resilience performance taking 
the 2007 level of each variable as its reference pre-crisis level.11 The metrics we compute 
answer the following questions. How much has a certain country worsened relative to its 
pre-crisis level? Has it already returned to its pre-crisis level, or by how much is it still 
below? Did the situation significantly improve over the medium-run?12 Table 2 summarizes 
the definitions of the metrics and the system capacities they are mainly associated with, 
while Figure 2 shows an example.13 
These metrics are computed for each of the 34 system variables described in the previous 
section. In a second step, they are combined into aggregated resilience indicators in order 
to assess the system-wide behaviour. Hence, we obtain for each country four aggregate 
indicators.  
As for the first three metrics, they are aggregated into indicators that describe the 
resilience performance of each given country relative to the performance of the other 
countries, by averaging their normalized values.14 The bouncing forward metric, on the 
other hand, assesses the resilience performance of countries in absolute terms. A country 
bounces forward with respect to a certain variable if its post-crisis level exceeds the pre-
crisis level significantly (considering the typical fluctuations of that variable in the pre-crisis 
                                           
11  This way we do not make a distinction between the cyclical and the trend behaviour of country performance. 
In fact, it would be quite difficult to assess the pre-crisis trend and its potential change after the crisis, given 
the relatively short time that has passed since the onset of the crisis. Moreover, though the timing and the 
exposure to the crisis might have varied across countries, it would also be hard to estimate these differences 
precisely.  
12  The meaningfulness of such questions was another selection guide among candidates for system variables. 
For example, the comparison to the pre-crisis levels of real price or per GDP variables is more meaningful 
than that of nominal versions. 
13  Beqiraj et al. (2017) uses a macroeconomic model to obtain the response to a set of Central and Eastern 
states to the crisis, and analyse their resistance (impact) and recovery performance. 
14  Metrics are normalized across countries by using a z-score transformation, which subtracts the cross-country 
average of the indicator from every single value, and then divides them by the cross-country standard 
deviation of the indicator. Very similar results are obtained with mean normalization also, where the 
normalized variable is calculated as follows: x’ = (x – min(x))/(max(x) – min(x)). Additional variants, like 
winsorizing, or the use of alternative weighting schemes across system variables yield indicators that are 
highly correlated with the baseline ones. 
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period). It is still recovering if the medium-run level is substantially below the starting 
level. In every other case, it is just recovering (as the case in Figure 2).15  
Table 2: The list of metrics used (see also Figure 2) 
Metrics Definition Capacity 
Impact of the crisis  
How much has the financial and 
economic crisis affected European 
countries? 
Difference between the worst level 
and 2007 
Mostly 
absorption 
Recovery from the crisis  
How much have countries recovered 
from the crisis? 
Difference between the worst level 
and the most recent available data 
Absorption and 
adaptation 
Medium-run performance 
What is the situation in the countries 
compared to the pre-crisis one? 
Change between the beginning of 
the crisis and the latest available 
data 
Mostly 
adaptation 
Bounce forward 
Did the situation significantly improve 
or deteriorate in the medium-run? 
Assessment of the statistical 
significance of the 'medium-run 
performance' metrics  
Adaptation and 
partly 
transformation 
 
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the evolution of a system variable and the resilience metrics 
 
 
The bouncing forward metric is also aggregated across variables to yield an overall 
bouncing forward indicator for each country. This indicator is positive if a country has 
bounced forward in more dimensions than in which it has significantly worsened, and 
negative otherwise. Notice that it is possible that a country exhibits a high degree of 
medium-run resilience, if it has done better than many other countries in many respects, 
and yet it does not bounce forward, if for most of the variables the medium-run 
improvement is not significant. Of course, in this case most of the other countries would 
not bounce forward, either. 
                                           
15  Formally, the metric takes value +1 (-1) if the medium term level is above (below) the 2007 level by at least 
one standard deviation of the observed values around a trend during the pre-crisis period (2000-2007). It is 
equal to 0 otherwise. 
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3.3 Resilience characteristics 
Resilience characteristics are variables that prove to be robust, significant and meaningful 
predictors of countries' resilient behaviour.16 Key candidates include variables linked to 
various aspects of governmental quality and other institutional features, economic 
performance, government expenditures, government indebtedness, gender equality, trust 
and more generally the ‘health’ of a society.  
We have collected data on about 200 potential resilience characteristics.17 A broad 
classification of variables is as follows: 
-  Digital development (e.g. connectivity, digital public services, …) 
- Education (e.g. country average PISA scores (Programme for International Student 
Assessment) in the various disciplines, share of people with primary, secondary and 
tertiary education, …) 
- Gender equality 
- Government expenditures by type (e.g. social, education, employment, health, …) 
- Innovation and R&D (eco-innovation index, R&D expenditures, innovation and 
sophistication factors, technological readiness, …) 
- Labour market policies and support (active and passive instruments and further 
components, Employment Protection Legislation) 
- Macroeconomic and financial performance (average GDP growth, investment share, 
trade openness, government indebtedness, …) 
- Market development and regulation (market size, financial market development, 
product market regulation, labour, product and financial market efficiency, …) 
- Quality of government (e.g. political stability, control of corruption, government 
efficiency, …)  
- Quality of life (health status, rates of chronic illness, fertility rate, poverty, living 
conditions, …) 
- Regulatory environment (e.g. ease of doing business index, regulatory quality, …) 
- Trust in the society and institutions (trust in parties, the legal system, civic 
engagement index, community attachment index, trust in institutions, …) 
Data sources are the World Bank, the OECD, the Global Competitiveness Index of the World 
Economic Forum, the Gallup World Poll Survey, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
Scoreboard, Eurostat, the EC digital scoreboard, and the European Institute for Gender 
Equality. Annex 2 provides details on the variables considered, including their definition, 
data sources and availability.18 
We also consider additional characteristics suggested by various recent JRC studies. In 
particular, we include the share of non-routine manual and of non-routine cognitive 
workers in employment, as well as the degree of automatic income stabilization due to 
fiscal instruments. Annex 3 provides further details on these characteristics. 
                                           
16  In parallel work, Brůha and Kucharčukova (2017) follow a similar two-step methodology. In their first step, 
they characterize commonalities and differences in macroeconomic developments (GDP growth and 
unemployment) across countries. The second step is to look for characteristics to explain the differences. 
17  To ensure a meaningful and homogenous country coverage, variables which were not available for at least 
26 of the EU-28 were omitted. With the exception of special indices (like those of digital connectivity or ease 
of doing business), we also restricted our attention to variables which were available from at least 2000. 
18  For the Global Competitiveness Index, we only include those 16 variables which are discussed in the main 
text or reported as additional results in Annex 7. Thus, we present a total of 85 characteristics. 
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In order to study which candidate characteristics are indeed associated with better 
resilience performance, we construct multi-year average values of these variables and 
compare these average levels with the resilience indicators described in the previous 
section. In particular, we take the 2000-2007, 2005-2007 and the 2008-2010 averages. 
The first two averages are pre-determined to and unaffected by the crisis shocks. In order 
to assess the relevance of the candidate characteristics with respect to the resilience 
performance in the immediate aftermath of the shock (impact indicator), we only consider 
these two averages.19 Finally, to assess the relevance of the candidate characteristics in 
the medium run (recovery indicator, medium-run performance and bounce forward 
indicator), we also look at the 2008-2010 average values.20 
It is important to stress that these characteristics do not necessarily correspond one-to-
one to potential policy tools to be utilized in a crisis. Instead, they generally capture some 
underlying, pre-existing features of countries that enable them to act resiliently in a crisis. 
Some of those features may relate directly to policies, while others can be more deeply 
seated, often influenced by policies only indirectly. By the same token, the general, broad 
and deep nature of these characteristics makes it more likely that they would not be too 
specific to the current crisis episode.  
                                           
19  For some variables, data coverage only starts around 2012. If it is unlikely that the variable was directly 
affected by the crisis, and its level is likely to reflect an underlying feature of the country, then we also 
consider such variables. Items from the EC Digital Scoreboard, or the `Ease of doing business’ index are 
such examples. 
20  Notice that some candidate characteristics are also system variables. When used as candidate resilience 
characteristics, these variables are taken in their level (average pre-crisis value); the resilience metrics are 
instead based on their change relative to 2007. This aims to ensure that there is no mechanical or spurious 
relationship between indicators and candidate characteristics. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Indicators of resilience 
Resilience performance is first assessed using the first three indicators described in Section 
3.1: impact of the crisis, recovery from the crisis and medium-run performance. 
Through a series of heat-maps and a correlation table (see Annex 4), we present the 
response of each system variable to the crisis. In each heat-map, countries are ranked 
according to their aggregate resilience indicator. 
The first result is that the most resilient countries show high resilience in the majority of 
the individual dimensions (i.e. underlying variables) and all three parts of the system (i.e. 
assets, engine, outcomes). This is also confirmed by the large number of high (at least 
0.5) correlation values in the correlation table (Annex 4), and the analysis of the bar charts 
of the resilience indicators broken down by assets/engine/outcomes (Annex 5, Figure 14). 
This finding is in line with one crucial conclusion based on the theoretical framework, i.e. 
that a system cannot be resilient in its outcomes unless it is resilient in its assets and 
engine. 
The second result is that in most cases, any statement on the resilience performance of a 
country crucially depends on the indicator of reference. Indeed, countries that are more 
resilient in their short-term response are not necessarily the ones better recovering in the 
medium-term. This is shown in the scatterplots in Figure 3, which compare the way 
countries react at different time horizons. The top panel shows the comparison of the 
impact indicator versus the recovery indicator, while the bottom one shows the impact 
indicator versus the medium-run performance.   
In both panels, countries in the bottom-left quadrant are those that suffered the most and 
recovered the least from the crisis (e.g. Greece and Cyprus). Looking at the upper panel, 
countries in the top-left quadrant experienced a high impact, but were able to recover quite 
well (e.g. Ireland and the Baltics). As shown in the bottom panel, however, these latter 
countries display only an average overall performance in the medium-run. In other words, 
their recovery was just enough to offset the initial drop and to yield an average medium-
run performance.  
As for the countries that have been impacted relatively little, their recovery indicator is 
more difficult to interpret, since they had comparatively little to recover from. For this 
reason, for these countries it is more informative to look at their medium-term performance 
(bottom panel). Among these countries, the best performing also in the medium-run (top-
right quadrant) are Germany, Malta, Bulgaria and Poland. 
To visualize the resilience of the EU 28 further, Figure 4 presents three heat-maps of the 
impact, recovery and medium–run indicators. This view highlights additional cross-
indicator patterns. Germany, Malta and Poland managed to be strongly resilient in the 
impact and medium-run indicators (they had little to recover from, so their recovery 
indicator is not so high). Similarly, Hungary, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
had a moderately high level of resilience (light green); Denmark, Portugal and Spain 
exhibited a medium level of resilience (light yellow), while Cyprus and Greece shows an 
overall low level of resilience (red and orange). 
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Figure 3: Scatterplots of resilience indicators for the full system  
 
 
Figure 4: Impact, Recovery and Medium Run indicators in the EU 28 
Impact Recovery Medium Run 
   
Shade of green indicates high resilience, shade of yellow medium resilience and shades of red low resilience. 
Malta is light green on impact (0.215), light green on recovery (0.551) and green in the medium run 
(0.699). 
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The results discussed above are based on the analysis of the full system, i.e. including both 
the strictly economic and financial variables as well as the variables that focus on 
individuals and relate to the social dimension. Indeed, a key contribution of our work is to 
broaden the perspective to including also aspects that are traditionally neglected in the 
economic literature. To evaluate the importance of considering the social dimension, we 
have also derived the resilience indicators only based on the smaller set of core economic 
and financial variables, and compared the results.  
Figure 5 contrasts the indicators based on the full system, with those computed only based 
on the economic and financial core, focusing on the impact indicator.21 Countries below the 
45° line perform worse when we adopt the system view, compared to when we take a 
narrow strictly economic angle. In other words, looking only at the economic performance 
of this group of countries would yield biased results, by making them appear more resilient 
than they have actually been. Notably, Malta, the United Kingdom and Hungary fall in this 
group of countries, for which the full picture is not as nice as the purely economic one. In 
case of Malta and Hungary, this applies to all the three indicators. 
Notice also that considering the whole system or the economic core (as presented in Table 
1) yields a different ranking of countries. For example, based on purely economic and 
financial variables (i.e. looking at the ranking of the countries along the x-axis), Hungary 
appears to have performed better than some other countries, namely Finland, the 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Belgium. At the same time, considering also variables 
with a more social connotation (i.e. looking at the ranking along the y-axis), it has done 
worse.  
Figure 5: Comparison between the system view and the core- economic view. 
 
 
For some countries, broadening the horizon of the analysis changes the picture 
considerably. When this is the case, the question that comes next is which variables are 
responsible for the different performance. We investigate this issue by pinning down the 
                                           
21  Annex 5 (Figure 15) presents the respective graphs for the recovery indicator and the medium-run 
performance indicator. 
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contribution of each single variable outside of the economic and financial core. Results for 
selected countries are presented in Annex 5 (Figure 16). For example, in the case of 
Belgium and Bulgaria, the recovery is more marked when expenditures on health and 
changes in the income distribution (inequality and social exclusion) are taken into account, 
compared to when they are not. As for the United Kingdom, the crisis brought about a 
worsening in self-perceived health of citizens and wages. When these aspects are taken 
into account, on top of the core economic indicators, the impact of the crisis looks more 
sizable. For Hungary, in order to be able to grasp fully the negative consequences of the 
crisis, one cannot ignore in particular the rise in income inequality, as well as the decreases 
in health and education expenditures (all in relative terms to other countries). 
 
4.2 Measuring bouncing forward  
The bouncing forward indicator is computed as the average of the bouncing forward metric 
(see Section 3.2) over the variables. The closer the value is to one, the more a country 
has bounced forward in the various socio-economic dimensions considered. Conversely, 
the closer to minus one, the more a country is still in recovery phase. 
Figure 6 shows the bouncing forward performance of EU countries on a heat-map. One can 
see that the Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), Croatia, 
the Netherlands and Slovenia were the least able to bounce forward (an indicator value of 
-0.2 or below). At the same time, Germany, Malta and Slovakia managed to bounce 
forward in quite many areas.  
Figure 6: The bounce forward indicator in the EU 28 
 
Shade of green indicates high resilience, shade of yellow medium resilience and shades of red low 
resilience. The value for Malta is 0.333 (light green). 
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Figure 7: Bouncing forward in the full system and its main ingredients 
 
Figure 7 further reveals that countries with a similar overall bouncing forward score might 
have in fact bounced forward in different respects. For example, Hungary and Malta have 
performed a great deal better in the core-economic dimensions relative to the more social 
ones, while the opposite is true for countries like Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Italy or Portugal.  
Large heterogeneity across countries is also apparent when the system is broken down 
into its three parts. Member States such as Denmark, Finland, France or Luxemburg, 
managed to bounce forward relatively more in their assets than in their engine or 
outcomes. Typically, the engine turned out to be more resilient than assets and outcomes 
in countries with a weak overall recovery, such as Cyprus or Greece. On the other hand, 
the recovery of Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania was mostly driven by strong performance 
in terms of outcomes. It means that in some cases, outcome variables bounced forward 
more than variables from the assets or the engine group.22  
It is also interesting to contrast the value of the bouncing forward indicator with the impact 
and medium-run resilience indicators presented in the previous section. As Figure 17 in 
Annex 5 shows, considering the bouncing forward performance further refines the 
conclusions about the resilience ranking of Member States.  
First, it substantiates the previous finding that a relatively high resilience in terms of impact 
does not necessarily imply the capacity to bounce forward, as for example is the case for 
Finland and the Netherlands (see the left panel of Figure 17, bottom-right quadrant).  
Second, the statistical association between bouncing forward and medium-run resilience is 
very strong, corresponding to a correlation of 0.9 (see the right panel of Figure 17). This 
may be due to the fact that most of the times, a strong (or weak) relative performance in 
the medium-run also meant an absolute improvement (worsening) relative to the pre-crisis 
situation. Hence, in most cases the medium-run performance indicator and the bounce 
forward indicator are significantly positive or negative. However, in some cases the two 
                                           
22  It seems to violate the “rule” that resilience in outcomes requires resilience also in assets and the engine. 
The finding however might also point to an imbalanced recovery and signal further difficulties in the future. 
At the same time, it is also possible that our measure for the bounce forward did not capture all aspects of 
the recovery process perfectly. 
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indicators tell slightly different stories. For example, Germany, the country that ranks only 
fourth in terms of medium-run resilience, displays the best bouncing forward performance 
by a wide margin. On the other end of the spectrum, Croatia, Spain and Italy seem to have 
done much better than Greece and Cyprus based on the medium-run resilience indicator. 
However, the bouncing forward performance of the former three countries is very similar 
to that of the latter two.  
Annex 6 offers a heat-map that describes the behaviour of each individual system variable 
in terms of the bouncing forward indicator. The following patterns emerge: 
- For the majority of the countries, some specific parts of the engine have not 
fully recovered yet. These are public finances (government debt, and to a lesser 
extent government deficit) and household balance sheets (owing to weaker loan 
dynamics for households and lower house prices). 
- At the same time, the majority of the countries have bounced forward in relation 
to some other variables belonging to the engine, namely labour market 
measures, productivity and R&D expenditures. 
- Most of the assets are just recovering, except for expenditures on health and 
on education, which have bounced forward compared to their pre-crisis levels. 
- Among the variables related to the outcomes, monetary-wellbeing variables 
(GDP, consumption and to a smaller degree income) have bounced forward 
more than the ones describing non-monetary aspects of wellbeing (e.g. 
happiness, inequality, social exclusion, NEET and unemployment). 
- Countries have bounced forward much more in terms of their GDP (with an 
average score of 0.43) than overall (with an average score of minus 0.06). 
Looking only at aggregate performance may hide many underlying processes, 
for example the ineffectiveness of the necessary reallocation process, or non-
monetary aspects of well-being. The system view, on the other hand, can detect 
such hidden features. 
 
4.3 Resilience characteristics 
Characteristics relate to various aspects of countries, such as the quality of government, 
gender equality, government expenditures in key dimensions, the level of government 
indebtedness, the employment rate by type of occupation23 and various measures of 
economic performance.24 
In this section, we analyse the association between candidate resilience characteristics and 
the resilience indicators (impact, medium-run and bouncing forward) for the system as a 
whole. We exclude the recovery indicator from the analysis because its quantitative 
interpretation is less clear than that of the other three, since a country could have 
experienced a low recovery simply as a consequence of a weak impact.25  
                                           
23  From the employment rate by type of occupation, we have considered the non-routine manual tasks (service 
and sales workers and elementary occupations –isco08: 5, 9) and the non –routine cognitive tasks 
(managers, professionals, and technicians and associate professionals –isco08: 1, 2, 3). 
24  Some characteristics (e.g. the ones on economic performance) are also considered in the computation of the 
resilience indicators, considering their behaviour during the crisis. When they are used as characteristics, we 
instead consider their level, to describe e.g. the general economic stance of a country pre-crisis, and not its 
response to the crisis. 
25  Annex 7 nevertheless reports some results for the recovery indicator as well. 
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Through univariate regressions, we identify those characteristics that exhibit the highest 
explanatory power for each resilience indicator. We then explore whether adding a second 
variable leads to a much-improved statistical fit.26 Depending on the type of the resilience 
indicator, the characteristics identified may signal the strength of the absorptive (impact), 
the adaptive (medium-run, bouncing forward), and even the transformative capacity of 
countries (bouncing forward). 
Considering resilience at impact, we find that the pre-crisis average values of the following 
variables rank first in terms of explanatory power:  
- government expenditures on social protection (as a share of GDP),  
- unit labour cost growth (3 year % change),  
- net international investment position (assets minus liabilities, % of GDP).  
This means that high values of expenditures on social protection, low growth of unit labour 
costs and a positive and large net external investment position of a country are associated 
with higher resilience to the crisis in the short term (a smaller impact). The current account 
balance ranks fourth. Notice that this latter variable, unit labour costs and the net 
international investment position are among the key indicators monitored in the context of 
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). As such, these variables may be seen as 
more closely related to the concept of vulnerability (see discussion in Section 3.2), while 
expenditures on social protection would be more related to the concept of absorptive 
capacity. 
Figure 8 plots the impact indicator against the level of social expenditure in the first panel, 
and unit labour cost growth in the second panel, while the top of Panel A of Table 3 shows 
the results of the most meaningful univariate regressions. 
 
Figure 8: Scatterplot for the most significant characteristics for the impact indicator.  
  
 
 
                                           
26  It certainly remains possible that certain variables are only proxying the influence of some other, neglected 
explanatory variable (“omitted variable bias”). However, this issue should be alleviated by the large number 
of candidate characteristics we test in the first place. In our follow-up, regional resilience analysis, we will 
apply more elaborate methodologies to tackle this problem. 
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Table 3: Results of the analyses of resilience characteristics, univariate and bivariate regressions.  
Panel A: Impact of the crisis 
Univariate Adjusted R2 Coefficient 
C14 Expenditures on social protection (00-07) 0.30 0.07*** 
C48 Unit labour cost % change (05-07) 0.29 -0.03*** 
C43 Net int’l. investment position (05-07) 0.26 0.007*** 
 
Bivariate   
C42 Current account balance (05-07) 0.52 0.09*** 
C16 GDP per capita (05-07) -0.99*** 
 
Panel B: Medium-run 
Univariate Adjusted R2 Coefficient 
C65 Political stability (08-10) 0.18 0.50** 
C82 Wages related to productivity (08-10) 0.17 0.42** 
C52 Financial sector liabilities (08-10) 0.14 -0.02** 
 
Bivariate Adjusted R2  
C43 Net int’l investment position (05-07) 0.38 0.008*** 
C44 Export market share (05-07) 0.009*** 
 
C65 Political stability(08-10) 0.30 0.68*** 
C16 GDP per capita (05-07) -0.43** 
 
Panel C: Bouncing forward 
Univariate Adjusted R2 Coefficient 
C82 Wages related to productivity (08-10) 0.28 0.32*** 
C70 Efficacy of corporate boards (08-10) 0.22 0.27*** 
C80 Intensity of local competition (08-10) 0.18 0.28** 
 
Bivariate Adjusted R2  
C80 Intensity of local competition (08-10) 0.49 0.40*** 
C44 Export market share (08-10) 0.007*** 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%.  
The period in parenthesis corresponds to the time window where the level of the characteristic is 
computed, e.g. the average of expenditures on social protection in the period 2000-2007 is 
considered. 
 
Annex 7 reports selected additional regressions. Interestingly, among the characteristics 
that are able to explain the resilience performance of countries at impact, we also find the 
share of manual workers over the labour force and gender inequality, both affecting 
resilience negatively. Other significant (and positive) characteristics include the current 
account balance, foreign market size (exports and imports), an innovation capacity 
measure, and the availability of local suppliers to meet business needs.  
For bivariate regressions, the best fit is obtained by featuring the current account balance 
and GDP per capita on the right hand side (see the bottom of Panel A of Table 3). These 
two variables together are able to explain over half of the variation in the impact indicator 
across countries. Although the negative sign attached to GDP per capita might appear 
somewhat surprising, it is probably due to the fact that Central and Eastern Member States 
did relatively better during the crisis, and they also exhibit lower per capita GDP levels. 
Finally, expenditures on social protection show up in many of the best bivariate 
regressions, coupled with the real effective exchange rate (also an indicator in the MIP), 
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the net international investment position, unit labour costs, the current account balance 
and the share of manual workers (see Annex 7 for details). In particular, when paired with 
unit labour costs or the net international asset position (the other best univariate 
performers), expenditures on social protection remain the most significant from the three, 
with its coefficient changing little. 
Overall, the variable of expenditures on social protection clearly stands out in terms of its 
explanatory power and correlation with the impact indicator. It is important to stress that 
this finding is not about the degree of using such expenditures as a tool during the crisis. 
Instead, it means that their high pre-crisis levels are associated with a good absorption 
capacity. This variable was also found to be highly correlated with measures of quality of 
life in previous JRC studies (see Joint Research Centre, 2016). Annex 8 elaborates further 
on the importance of expenditures on social protection as established by the literature and 
provides a short overview of available relevant works.  
When it comes to explaining the medium-run resilience performance of countries (Panel B 
of Table 3 and Annex 7), the most significant variables are political stability, the extent to 
which wages are perceived to be linked to productivity, and the size of financial sector 
liabilities. With the exception of the last variable, correlations are positive, i.e. the more 
stable the government is, and the more wages are perceived to be well-related to 
productivity, the higher the medium term resilience of a country (see Figure 9). At the 
same time, a relatively sustained growth of financial sector liabilities (e.g. bank deposits 
and debt securities), which is also monitored in the context of the MIP, is associated with 
lower resilience in the medium term.  
 
Figure 9: Scatterplots for the most relevant characteristics for the medium-run indicator.  
  
 
Focusing on the most relevant variable, the importance of a stable and predictable political 
landscape to foster medium-term resilience does not come as a surprise. Indeed, political 
instability is conducive to a generally uncertain environment, where for example 
investment decisions tend to be postponed, dragging on the economic recovery. 
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When adding a second regressor, the explanatory power increases often quite 
substantially.27 The most meaningful specification, which includes the net international 
investment position and the growth of the export market share (5 year % change, also an 
indicator in the MIP), is reported in Panel B of Table 3, while other relevant ones are in 
Annex 7. This bivariate regression shows that to determine the medium-run trajectory of 
a country, not only domestic factors count. In fact, the relative position of a country vis-
à-vis its global competitors seems to matter even more.   
Finally, as for the bouncing forward indicator (Panel C, Table 3), we do not find standard 
macroeconomic indicators among the ones which yield the best fit. On the contrary, the 
perception about wages being related to productivity is the single variable that is able to 
best explain the ability of a country to bounce forward. It is followed by an index of the 
efficacy of corporate boards, i.e. the perception about country management being 
accountable to investors and boards of directors. The third-best explanatory variable is the 
perception about the intensity of competition in the local market. All these three variables 
point to the key role of a country’s business environment in promoting its adaptive and 
transformative capacities. 
Moving to bivariate regressions, the combination of the intensity of local competition and 
the growth of the export market share is able to explain almost half of the variation in the 
bouncing forward indicator, with both coefficients strongly significant. Annex 7 reports 
some additional interesting specifications, where the variables discussed in relation to the 
medium-run indicator prove again to be significant.28 
Overall, the explanatory power of the regressions is in some cases remarkably good, when 
e.g. a single variable is able to explain 30% of the variance of the resilience indicator of 
relevance, or only two variables explain more than half of the variation. In other cases, 
particularly in univariate specifications, the goodness of fit is not breath-taking. This 
suggests that resilience is ultimately the outcome of a complex interplay of various factors, 
which is difficult to describe by simple regressions. This is particularly true when looking 
at medium-run resilience and bouncing forward. Moreover, for these two latter indicators, 
the relevant characteristics are related to more structural features of the system, namely 
political stability and business conditions. 
It is worth noting that the net international investment position is highly correlated with all 
the resilience indicators. 
Finally, there are some variables exhibiting no, or no strong correlation with resilience 
indicators, tough one could expect the opposite. Examples include some of the variables 
measuring the quality of governance (for example, government efficiency or the control of 
corruption), measures of educational attainment or the income stabilization ability of the 
fiscal system. This result surely deserves further investigation.  
                                           
27  It means that there are many variables that bring in additional explanatory power only once political stability 
(or one of the other best performing regressors in the univariate model) has already been controlled for. 
28  We have also experimented with running separate regressions for resilience indicators defined only for the 
core-economic variables. In general, the results are fairly similar, with some noticeable changes. In 
particular, for the impact, expenditures on social protection remain the best single characteristic, while 
investment becomes much more important for the core-economic variables. For the medium-run, there is 
some improvement in the fit. Finally, for the bouncing forward, two out of the top ten performers drop in 
their predictive power when switching between the two sets of variables (foreign competition index and trust 
in the financial system). 
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5 Additional analyses at the regional level  
This section reports some additional findings that emerged from JRC studies conducted at 
the regional level, pointing to important future research directions.  
The first contribution relates to a JRC study aimed at measuring economic resilience at the 
regional level. It opens a major avenue for future research, which could extend the detailed 
analysis on socio-economic resilience and its characteristics from the country to the 
regional or even city level.  
The second part of this section presents an ongoing analysis looking at the short- and long-
run impact of globalization on regional income inequality and economic performance, which 
will help understanding how and how much regions can harness globalization and bounce 
forward.  
 
5.1 Economic resilience of the EU regions  
The JRC has developed a preliminary indicator of resilience at the regional level, building 
on the behaviour of GDP per capita, employment and productivity (see Pontarollo and 
Serpieri, 2017, and Joint Research Centre, 2017a). This composite index has been 
constructed for 263 NUTS-2 regions. Figure 10 illustrates the resilience of these regions to 
the financial crisis. The regional resilience indicator varies between 0 and 1, where the 
smaller values (lighter) indicate the less resilient regions, and the higher (darker) the more 
resilient ones.  
Figure 10: Regional resilience over the period 2000-2015 by NUTS2. 
 
Source: JRC calculations, using Cambridge Econometrics European Regional Database data.  
Light indicates low, dark indicates high resilience. 
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As expected, the consequences of the crisis were not uniform across EU regions. Strong 
disparities in the impact and recovery can be observed. Regions in Mediterranean countries 
were the most affected by the crisis, and the least able to recover owing to their structural 
problems. At the same time, Germany and Northern countries exhibited stronger 
absorptive and adaptive capacities. 
The lack of competitiveness, heavy indebtedness, and large exposure to financial markets 
have plunged Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain into a recession deeper than in many other 
European countries. However, the effects are not uniform even across regions of the same 
country, as some of them have shown a much lower resilience than others. For example, 
a combination of strong economic activity, more stable public finances and a favourable 
political environment helped Germany to recover faster overall. Its western regions, 
however, were substantially more resilient than the eastern ones. 
The construction of these regional indicators shares many features of the approach 
presented in the previous Sections, but there are also differences. Most importantly, while 
in the country level analysis we distinguish between different aspects and capacities of 
resilience, the regional indicator is a single composite one. When comparing its country-
level average values to the indicators used for the country-level analysis, it is quite similar 
to the recovery and medium run measures, but there are some differences. It is left for 
future work to synthetize these different approaches. 
The 2017 edition of the European Territorial Trends (Joint Research Centre, 2017a) 
presents a further analysis of regional competitiveness. Building an indicator using regional 
characteristics of GDP, employment, productivity and demography, regional 
competitiveness is shown to depend not only on the features of each individual region, but 
on those of surrounding regions (neighbouring effects). These spillovers go beyond national 
borders, and also affect regional resilience. This points to the need to evaluate regional 
(e.g. sub-national) imbalances, not only in terms of GDP, but also productivity, 
employment and demography. 
The development of the Regional Resilience and Regional Competitiveness indicators is 
part of a wider framework in support to European territorial policies, carried out in the 
LUISA Territorial Modelling Platform. 
 
5.2 The resilience of regions to competition shocks 
In a recent paper, Cseres-Gergely and Kvedaras (2018) look at regional income inequality 
in EU15 countries during the 2000s, and analyse the role of China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) at the end of 2002. China's exports increased dramatically after 
its entry into the WTO. The analysis seeks to uncover how much of the change in regional 
household income inequality over time can be attributed to the implied trade pressure. It 
follows similar ideas as Autor et al. (2016). 
The units of the analysis are NUTS1 regions within the EU15. Two channels through which 
the competitive pressure reaches firms are analysed. First, pressure can change the income 
distribution within a sector in a way that is not obvious to foresee: wages can either rise 
or drop at different points of the income distribution (within sector channel). This depends 
on whether the importance of a given type of occupation is more valuable in staying 
competitive or slated to be laid off to cut costs. Second, the employment share of the 
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affected sector in regional employment decreases if it cannot withhold the pressure, 
through both layoffs and the exit of firms (between sector channel). Such selection 
happens at the firm level, but can be seen as part of the process through which regional 
economies transform. 
The study captures competitive pressure dynamics by the share of China in global trade 
and the ratio of Chinese exports to regional economic activity.29 Then it uses panel 
regressions to model its effect on regional inequality and industry labour shares. Results 
show that inequality within regions would have increased in any case, but the trade 
pressure contributed explaining about half of the changes (mostly increases), through both 
channels described above. Figure 11 shows that the effect of the trade pressure explains 
a considerable part of the change in inequality from 1999 to 2012, especially in some 
regions of the Mediterranean countries and the United Kingdom.  
Figure 11: Change in the log variance of net household income from 1999 to 2012, total (left panel) 
and the part attributable to the expansion of Chinese exports as explained by the model (NUTS1 
regions. 
 
Source: JRC calculations from microdata of the European Community Household Panel (1999 figures) 
and the EU SILC (2012 figures). Preliminary results, Germany not included. 
 
The current research stops at household income inequality as an outcome, but the setup 
promotes future analyses extended towards the resilience of regional economies, in 
particular their ability to take advantage of the competition pressure and bounce forward. 
Competition pressure is a shock affecting the engine of the economy, in particular the 
operation of the firms, through which the local economy reconfigures itself. The current 
analysis can be interpreted as a first step, where the resilience of a single system variable, 
inequality, is assessed. 
                                           
29  The analysis considers both “global” trade pressure from China on the country (ratio between the Chinese 
exports worldwide and the country exports worldwide) and “domestic” trade pressure from China on the 
country (ratio between the Chinese exports in the country and the value added of manufacturing in the 
country).  
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Research on the effects of globalisation is ongoing, and resilience to the shock of external 
competition on the global market is its main theme. Consumers usually gain from 
globalisation. Opening to international trade was however shown to be capable of inducing 
large and lasting drops in employment and wages if the reconfiguration of regional markets 
is slow – see Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017) for evidence from Brazil. This is in line with 
the more general result of Pascali (2017), showing that globalisation seems to benefit only 
countries with well-functioning institutions.  
Firms of opening economies, at least those that are able to export and actually do so, could 
gain more than a quarter of their productivity by switching to importing better quality 
intermediate goods – see Halpern et al. (2015) for results from post-socialist transition. 
The long-term survival of firms seems to require a change of technology as well, both in 
the form of increased innovation activity, and as an increased preference for a more skilled 
workforce – see Bloom et al. (2016) for an analysis of the reconfiguration process during 
the recent rise of China. The shock yields in this case more efficient operation and hence 
a bouncing forward, but only for the survivors of the process. 
 
 29 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper has shed some light on how EU countries have responded to the crisis. In 
particular, it has addressed the following questions. Which countries showed a resilient 
behaviour during and after the crisis? Is resilience related only to the economic dimension? 
Has any of the EU countries been able to use the crisis as an opportunity and 'bounce 
forward'? Is it possible to identify any particular country characteristic linked to resilience?  
The exercise has led to the following main results and conclusions. 
- Results from a narrow exercise focusing on macroeconomic and financial variables 
confirm the validity of the measurement approach. For instance, and not 
surprisingly, Germany appears to be among the most resilient countries. Ireland has 
been severely hit by the crisis but also showed a good absorptive capacity. Italy 
seems to be still struggling with the recovery, while Greece suffered the most serious 
consequences of the crisis. 
- Ranking countries according to their resilience is not obvious. Their resilience 
performance depends on the indicator of reference: countries that are more resilient 
in their short-term response may not necessarily be the ones better performing in 
the medium-term. For example, while Germany and Poland appear to be among the 
most resilient countries both in the short and in the medium run, Bulgaria and the 
Baltics score better in the medium than in the short run.  
- For a deep understanding of resilient behaviour and the associated underlying 
country characteristics, the social dimension needs to be taken into account. 
Broadening the perspective has an impact on the resilience assessment of a number 
of countries. For instance, when considering social variables such as social exclusion, 
happiness, health expenditures and wages, Bulgaria looks more resilient than when 
focussing only on economic and financial aspects. On the opposite, Hungary looks 
less resilient when the social dimension is factored in. The importance of this broader 
perspective further reinforces the case for the recent endorsement of the European 
Pillar of Social Rights,30 and for the inclusion of the social dimension in the work of 
the European Semester. 
- We assess whether countries have been overall able to bounce forward, i.e. to 
improve their situation compared to the pre-crisis period. Countries' performance in 
this respect is substantially heterogeneous across Member States: while Croatia, 
Cyprus, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain still lag behind their pre-
crisis performance in the majority of relevant socio-economic dimensions, countries 
like Germany, Malta and Slovakia managed to bounce forward in many areas. 
- When looking at the bouncing forward performance by individual variables, some 
patterns emerge. In most countries, active labour market measures, productivity 
and R&D expenditures have increased compared to their pre-crisis level. Countries 
have been generally able to bounce forward more as far as monetary aspects of 
wellbeing (GDP, consumption and income) are concerned, compared to non-
monetary aspects of wellbeing (e.g. happiness, inequality, social exclusion and the 
share of young people not in employment, nor education, nor training). This latter 
finding confirms the need to consider the social dimension. 
                                           
30  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/social-summit-european-pillar-social-rights-
booklet_en.pdf 
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- The analysis tested around 200 candidate resilience characteristics. Some result to 
be associated with resilient behaviour, and therefore could indicate entry points for 
policies to increase countries' resilience to economic and financial crises. 
- Country characteristics differ in their association with resilience in the short- and the 
medium-run. Countries thus need to use a combination of different policies to 
enhance both their short- and medium-run resilience. 
- No single characteristic can explain resilience alone. This is even truer when trying 
to characterize resilient behaviour over the medium-run, including the capacity of a 
system to bounce forward. This confirms that the absorption, and even more the 
adaptation and transformation processes, are shaped by multiple factors. 
- High values of pre-crisis government expenditures on social protection are 
associated with a less dramatic crisis impact. The importance of the expenditure on 
social protection is in line with results obtained in a previous JRC analysis on the 
quality of life. 
- Countries that, in the early period of the crisis, were characterized by higher political 
stability performed better in the medium run.  
- Countries that were better able to ‘bounce forward’ tend to be characterized by a 
better alignment of wages and productivity, and more generally by a more effective 
business environment.  
- Countries that are net creditors vis-`a-vis the rest of the world tend to be more 
resilient than net debtors in all dimensions analysed. 
- Some of the candidate characteristics related to the quality of government and 
institutions, the educational system, and the income stabilization ability of the fiscal 
system do not show up among the most relevant in determining the resilience of a 
country. This may call for further investigation. 
At a more general level, the analysis contributes to resilience thinking in the following four 
respects: 
- We develop a measurement framework for the quantitative assessment of resilience. 
- We broaden the perspective by considering the socio-economic system as a whole, 
beyond purely economic aspects. 
- We emphasize the concept of 'bouncing forward', linked to a definition of resilience 
where crises are taken as opportunities to actually transform and improve. 
- We identify some underlying resilience characteristics that may be associated with 
resilient behaviour. 
Extending this analysis to a regional level is a major future research line. A territorial 
analysis has already revealed a large degree of regional heterogeneity in the levels of 
resilience to the crisis. Moreover, regional resilience may vary even within countries.  
Research is currently ongoing on the effects of globalisation and the resilience of regions 
to the shock of increased competition on the global market. While preliminary results stop 
at income inequality as an outcome, showing that globalisation plays a role in increasing 
income inequality at the level of regions, future analyses will extend towards the overall 
resilience of regional economies, in particular their ability to take advantage of the 
competition pressure, harness globalization and bounce forward. 
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Annex 1. Glossary of definitions 
Ingredients of the system: the main elements of the system. The first element is assets, 
i.e., the inputs of the system, including natural, human, social and built capital (as in the 
“four capitals” approach to sustainability). The second element is the ‘engine’ of the entire 
socio-economic, political and environmental system, which connects assets with the third 
element, outcomes. The engine includes eco system services, socio system services, and 
institutions in a very general sense (markets, infrastructures, businesses and research, 
policies and communities), shaping the production process and utilizing the available 
capitals to produce outputs. Outcomes include variables that are ingredients or proxies of 
individual and societal wellbeing (including negative outcomes like waste), and also 
investment in the assets. 
Resilience characteristics: observable and measurable features of a system that prove 
to be positively associated with a resilient behaviour.  
Resilience indicators: composite indicators based on the aggregation of resilience 
metrics across certain groups of system variables. 
Resilience metrics: quantitative properties of the response of a system variable to a 
shock, related to resilience. In this study, we have considered the depth of the impact, the 
extent of the recovery, the medium-run performance and the bouncing forward capacity. 
Others can include the time to recover, the difference between the pre-shock and the post-
shock trend, or the cumulated difference between the actual response and a no-shock 
counterfactual. 
System variables: observable variables that describe the functioning of a certain part of 
the system. For assets, examples could be the value of residential real estate (dwellings), 
government expenditures on education, self-perceived fairness and trust. For the engine: 
firm productivity, R&D expenditures, labour market policies, trust in the legal system; while 
for outcomes: quality of life measures, GDP, consumption, unemployment. 
Core-economic variables: the set of variables describing the most important financial 
and economic aspects of system (see Annex 2 for the complete list). 
System view: set of variables describing the system including both the core-economic 
variables and the socio-economic ones (see Annex 2 for the complete list). 
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Annex 2: Detailed information on the variables 
Core-economic variables  
The group of core-economic and financial variables comprises 13 variables. This set is of 
course very small compared to the innumerable variables related to the real economy and 
financial markets, whose developments have been influenced by the crisis. However, it is 
large enough to cover various parts of the economic and financial system, including output, 
consumer prices, the labour market, asset prices, financial markets, and public finances. 
As for economic developments, to measure the output loss over the crisis period we use 
the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a reference variable, which is classified as an 
outcome according to the system view. We also include (real) investment, i.e. one of the 
components of GDP, which is at the same time an output and an asset.31 To account for 
price developments, we consider upside and downside deviations of consumer price 
inflation from the 2% target level. 
Turning to the labour market, we consider both the unemployment rate and the 
employment rate, which are both classified as outcomes according to the system view. 
However, while the former has a clearly negative connotation, the latter can be positively 
related to the concept of wellbeing.32 A third variable related to the labour market is labour 
productivity, which is expressed as real output per total hours worked in a year. 
Asset prices are a crucial ingredient when assessing resilience in the context of economic 
and financial crises. In fact, the literature shows that asset price booms, in particular when 
they are leverage-fuelled, are good early warning indicators of future crises (see Alessi and 
Detken 2011, 2017). Hence, we include in our analysis stock prices, which started 
plummeting at the end of 2007, and house prices, which have also seen a huge drop at 
the aggregate European level after having grown substantially in the run-up to the crisis. 
Following years in which excessive credit growth was fuelling booming asset prices, a 
severe credit crunch hit the real economy. To measure the depth of the credit crunch, and 
general credit market developments and conditions, we used three measures. The first is 
the level of the aggregate private sector debt (as a ratio to GDP), i.e. debt securities and 
loans held by households and non-financial corporations. The second and the third 
measures are more disaggregated, and correspond to lending to non-financial corporations 
and lending to households, respectively. Asset prices and financial markets more in general 
belong to the engine, according to the system view. 
Finally, we consider public finances, which have worsened due to the crisis in particular in 
some vulnerable countries. To do so, we include in the analysis the two reference variables, 
i.e. government debt (in percentage of GDP) and the government budget balance (also as 
a percentage of GDP). The government, as an institution, belongs to the engine according 
to the system view. 
Further details are reported in Table 4 below. 
 
                                           
31  In the analyses distinguishing the three system components, we classify investments as an asset. 
32  It is worth recalling that while the unemployment rate corresponds to the share of unemployed persons over 
the labour force (i.e. the total number of people employed or actively seeking work), the employment rate 
is computed as the number of persons employed over the total population. Hence, the two variables are not 
the plain mirror image of each other. 
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The system view 
This group contains 21 additional variables, spanning the entire system in a balanced way, 
and shifting the emphasis towards individuals, and individual and societal wellbeing. Table 
4 provides detailed definitions, data sources and specific information on each system 
variable included in the analysis. Here we only briefly present their list, according to their 
place in the system (though the classification of some of the variables is not 
straightforward). 
Assets  
Social capital: perceived fairness in the society, the level of trust among people, 
government expenditures on health. 
Human capital: government expenditures on education. 
Built capital: (real) value of the dwelling stock. 
Engine 
Markets: share of temporary contracts, (real) compensation per employee, labour market 
policies (active and passive). 
Business and research: total expenditures on R&D. 
Communities and social ties: intensity of social activities. 
Institutions: citizens’ level of trust in the EU Parliament and in the legal system. 
Outcomes 
Wellbeing: self-perceived health, life satisfaction, happiness, (real) household 
consumption, household (real) disposable income. 
Negative outcomes: poverty and social exclusion, income inequality, NEET (share of young 
people who are Not in Education, Employment, or Training). 
The data source for the vast majority of the system variables, particularly for the standard 
economic and financial indicators, is Eurostat. Stock prices are from Bloomberg. To cover 
social and wellbeing aspects, we use various questions from the European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), the European Social Survey (ESS) and the 
European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS). 
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Table 4: List of system variables 
Nr. System Variables Source Definition/Construction Time 
period 
System 
part 
Core 
view 
Adjustment 
Shorthand Name 
V1 CORP. LOANS Loans to Non- 
Financial 
Corporations 
Eurostat Loans to Non-Financial Corporations (million Euros) 2004-2016 Engine 1 % difference from 
2007 level (see notes) 
V2 DWELLINGS Value of dwellings Eurostat Balance sheets for non-financial assets dwellings in 
current prices million euros divided by consumer 
price index 
2000-2014 Asset 0 Log transformation of 
deflated measure 
V3 EMPLOYMENT Employment  
Rate 
Eurostat Number of persons aged 20 to 64 in employment by 
the total population of the same age group 
2000-2016 Outcome 1 
 
V4 EXP. EDUCATION Government 
Expenditures on 
Education 
Eurostat Government Expenditures on Education, per GDP 
value multiplied by GDP, chain linked volumes 
(2010), million euro 
2000-2015 Asset 0 Log transformation 
V5 EXP. HEALTH Government 
Expenditures on 
Health 
Eurostat Government Expenditures on Health, per GDP value 
multiplied by GDP, chain linked volumes (2010), 
million euro 
2000-2015 Asset 0 Log transformation 
V6 EXP. R&D Total 
expenditures on 
R&D 
Eurostat Government Expenditures on R&D, million purchasing 
power standards (PPS) at 2005 prices 
2003-2015 Engine 0 Log transformation 
V7 FAIRNESS Self-perceived 
 fairness 
ESS Survey based –subjective measure. The survey 
question "Most people try to take advantage of you if 
they got the chance, or try to be fair".  The variable 
is the share of those answering 7 to 10 (agree with 
fairness) out of a scale of 10. 
2002-2014, 
biannual 
Asset 0 
 
V8 GDP Gross Domestic  
Product 
Eurostat Real GDP volume, index 2010 = 100 2000-2016 Outcome 1 Log transformation 
V9 GOV. DEBT Government  
debt 
Eurostat Government  
debt as percentage of GDP 
2000-2016 Engine 1 
 
V10 GOV. DEFICIT Government 
budget balance 
Eurostat Government budget balance as percentage of GDP 2000-2016 Engine 1 
 
V11 HAPPINESS Happiness EQLS Survey based –subjective measure. The survey 
question “How happy are you?” The variable is the 
share of those answering 7 to 10 ( the happiest) out 
of a scale of 10 
2003, 2007, 
2011, 2016 
Outcome 0 
 
V12 HEALTH Self-perceived 
health 
EU SILC Survey based –subjective measure. Share of 
respondents indicating a level of "good" or "very 
good" (the top two out of 5) 
2006-2015 Outcome 0 
 
V13 HH CONSUMPTION Household 
Consumption 
Eurostat Household Consumption, volume index 2010=100 2000-2016 Outcome 0 Log transformation 
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Nr. System Variables Source Definition/Construction Time 
period 
System 
part 
Core 
view 
Adjustment 
Shorthand Name 
V14 HH INCOME Household 
disposable 
income 
Eurostat Household real gross disposable income, PPS per 
capita 
2002-2015 Outcome 0 Log transformation 
V15 HH LOANS Household loans Eurostat Loans to Households as percentage of GDP 2000-2016 Engine 1 (see notes) 
V16 HOUSE PRICES House Prices 
Index 
Eurostat House Prices Index, 2015=100 2000-2016 Engine 1 Log transformation 
V17 INEQUALITY Inequality Eurostat The S80/S20 ratio. The S80 is the share of income 
held by the 80-10 percentile of the income 
distribution; while S20 is the share held by the 0-20. 
2006-2015 
(HR 2010-, 
ROM 2007-) 
Outcome 0 Log transformation 
V18 INFLATION Inflation  
deviation 
Eurostat Absolute deviation of inflation from 2 percent. 2000-2016 Engine 1 
 
V19 INVESTMENT Investment Eurostat Gross fixed capital formation, volume index 
2010=100. It includes capital formation of resident 
producers' acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed 
tangible or intangible assets. This covers in particular 
machinery and equipment, vehicles, dwellings and 
other buildings. 
2000-2016 Asset 1 Log transformation 
V20 LABOUR PROD. Labour 
productivity 
Eurostat Labour productivity index, 2010=100. Real output 
per total hours worked in a year. 
2000-2016 Engine 1 Log transformation 
V21 LMP ACTIVE Active Labour 
Market Policies 
Eurostat Total active labour market policies (LMP measure 2-
7), per GDP value multiplied by GDP, chain linked 
volumes (2010), million euro 
2000-2015 Engine 0 Log transformation 
V22 LMP PASSIVE Passive Labour 
Market Policies 
Eurostat Total passive labour market policies (LMP support 8-
9),  per GDP value multiplied by GDP, chain linked 
volumes (2010), million euro 
 
Engine 0 Log transformation 
V23 NEET Not in 
employment nor 
in education and 
training 
Eurostat Young people (15-24 years) neither in employment 
nor in education and training,  percentage of the total 
population in the same age group 
2002-2016 Outcome 0 
 
V24 PRIVATE DEBT Private debt Eurostat Private debt (loans and securities) as percentage of 
GDP 
2003-2015 Engine 1 
 
V25 SATISFACTION Life Satisfaction EQLS Survey based –subjective measure. The survey 
question: “How satisfied would you say you are with 
your life these days?” The variable is the share of 
those answering 7 to 10 on a scale from 1  (very 
dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied) 
2003, 2007, 
2011, 2016 
Outcome 0 
 
V26 SOCIAL ACTIVITY Social ties ESS Survey based –subjective measure. The survey 
question: How often people socially meet with 
friends, relatives or colleagues. The variable includes 
those answering they meet every day. 
2002-2014, 
biannual 
Engine 0 
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Nr. System Variables Source Definition/Construction Time 
period 
System 
part 
Core 
view 
Adjustment 
Shorthand Name 
V27 SOCIAL EXCLUSION At risk of poverty 
or  social 
exclusion 
Eurostat Share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
(AROPE), as percentage of total population.  AROPE 
refers to  the situation of people either at risk of 
poverty, or severely materially deprived or living in a 
household with a very low work intensity. 
2006-2015 Outcome 0 
 
V28 STOCK PRICES Stock Price Index Bloomberg Stock Price Index 2000-2016 Engine 1 Log transformation 
V29 TEMPORARY WORK Temporary 
contracts 
Eurostat Share of people having a temporary contracts, from 
20 to 64 years, as percentage of total employment 
2003-2016 Engine 0 
 
V30 TRUST EP Trust in the 
European 
Parliament 
ESS Survey based- subjective measure. The share of 
respondents answering 7-10  on a scale from 0 (not 
trust at all) to 10 (complete trust) 
2002-2014, 
biannual 
Engine 0 
 
V31 TRUST LEGAL Trust in the legal 
system 
ESS Survey based- subjective measure. The share of 
respondents answering 7-10  on a scale from 0 (not 
trust at all) to 10 (complete trust) 
2002-2014, 
biannual 
Engine 0 
 
V32 TRUST PEOPLE Self-perceived 
 trust 
ESS The survey question "Most people can be trusted or 
you can't be too careful".  The variable is the share of 
those answering 7 to 10 (agree with trust). 
2002-2014, 
biannual 
Asset 0 
 
V33 UNEMPLOYMENT Unemployment Eurostat Unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour 
force (15-74 years) . The labour force is the total 
number of people employed and unemployed. 
2000-2016 Outcome 1 
 
V34 WAGES Real Wage Eurostat Compensation of employees per hour worked in 
Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) deflated by EU28 
Consumer Price Index 
2000-2016 Engine 0 Log transformation 
Notes. ESS: European Social Survey, EQLS: European Quality of Life Survey, EU SILC: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. Data for Belgium is available 
until 2015 for V20. Data for Croatia is available since 2002 for variables (V4, V5, V9, V10, V14, V15 and V28), since 2003 for variable V34, and since 2010 for variable V17. 
Data for Cyprus is available since 2001 (V5), 2002 (V14), and 2004 (V16). Data for Estonia is available since 2005 for V16. Data for Hungary is available since 2007 for V16. 
Data for Ireland is available since 2012 (V15) and until 2015 (V16, V1). Data for Latvia is available since 2004 for V15. Data for Lithuania is available since 2004 for V14. 
Data for Malta is available since 2004 for V15 and missing entirely for V14. Data for Luxemburg is missing entirely for V14.  Data for Poland is available since 2002 (V4, V5) 
and 2008 (V16). Data for Romania is available since 2008 (V16) and 2007 (V17). Data for Slovenia is available since 2002 (V15) and 2003 (V16, V28). Data for Slovakia is 
available since 2016 for V16. 
Due to measurement issues, the value of new corporate and household loans can be negative (in case of more repayments than new disbursements). For this reason, we 
could not define the percentage drop in household loans relative to its 2007 level. Instead, we resorted to the slightly less informative per GDP variant.  
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List of candidate resilience characteristics 
Data sources are the World Bank, the OECD, the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum, the Gallup World Poll Survey, 
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure Scoreboard, Eurostat, the EC digital scoreboard, and the European Institute for Gender Equality. 
Data used from the World Bank are: (i) Worldwide Governance Indicators, which aggregate individual governance indicators for six 
dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home); (ii) ease of doing business index, which measures business 
regulations and the protection of property rights. (http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2018) 
Data from the OECD are: (i) the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), which is a triennial international survey which 
aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students 
(http://www.oecd.org/pisa/aboutpisa/); (ii) indicators of employment protection legislation which measure the procedures and costs 
involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work 
agency contracts. (http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm); (iii) indicators of product market regulation, 
which measure the degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition in areas of the product market where competition is viable. 
(http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/indicatorsofproductmarketregulationhomepage.htm#indicators)  
For the Global Competitiveness Index, all variables and pillars related to 2007, 2008-2010 have been included in the analysis. Due to limited 
country coverage and/or irrelevance, the following details items had to be excluded though: Business Impact of Malaria, Malaria Prevalence, 
Country Credit Ranking, Effect of taxation on incentives to invest, Effect of taxation on incentives to work, Country capacity to retain and 
Country capacity to attract talents, International Internet bandwidth, Mobile broadband subscription, PCT patents. For the following, we 
could only use their 2010 values: Irregular payments and bribes, Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes, Efficiency of legal 
framework in challenging regulations, Quality of railroad infrastructure, Transport infrastructure, Electricity and telephony infrastructure, 
Affordability of financial services, Financial services meeting business needs, Technological adoption and ICT use. 
(https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2017-2018)  
The Gallup World Poll measures key indicators such as law and order, food and shelter, job creation, migration, financial life, personal 
health, civic engagement and evaluative well-being, that are related to other world development indicators. Indicators are supported by 
individual questions on the same topics. 
The indicators in the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) Scoreboard are used to identify emerging or persistent macroeconomic 
imbalances in a country. It consists of fourteen scoreboard indicators measuring internal and external imbalances as well as social and 
labour market developments. (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/macroeconomic-imbalances-procedure/indicators)  
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The digital scoreboard measures the performance of Europe and the Member States in a wide range of areas, from connectivity and digital 
skills to the digitisation of businesses and public services. (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/scoreboard)  
The Gender Equality Index of the European Institute for Gender Equality is a composite indicator that measures differences between women 
and men across the domains of work, money, knowledge, power, time and health (http://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index). 
Table 5 lists the code, label, source, definition and data availability for our characteristics. For the Global Competitiveness Index, we only 
include those 16 variables that are discussed in the main text or reported as additional results in Annex 7. Thus, we present a total of 85 
characteristics. The variables are first alphabetized by their data source, and then by their label. The symbol * refers to indicators based on 
European Commission (2017). 
 
Table 5: List of candidate resilience characteristics 
Code Label Source Definition Data 
availability 
C1 Public and private debt AMECO* Public and private debt is measured as the sum of consolidated general government gross debt and 
private sector debt, as a percentage of GDP. 
2007-2016  
C2 Real wages change 07-10 AMECO* Change in real wages in percentage points from 2007 to 2010. 2002-2016 
C3 Unemployment change 07-10 AMECO* Change in unemployment in percentage points from 2007 to 2010. 2000-2017  
C4 Gender Equality Index European Institute 
for Gender Equality  
Overall index, based on the following  dimensions  (work, money, knowledge, time, power, health). 2005, 2010, 
2012, 2015 
C5 Active Labour Market Policies Eurostat Government expenditures on labour market policy as log of millions euro of LMP measures. Includes 
training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, start-
up incentives. 
2000-2015 
C6 At risk of poverty or social 
exclusion 
Eurostat Share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE), % total population.  AROPE refers to  
the situation of people either at risk of poverty, or severely materially deprived or living in a household 
with a very low work intensity. 
2005-2016 
C7 Eco-innovation index Eurostat Composite index which measures how well individual MS perform in eco-innovation compared to the 
EU average, which is equated with 100. The index is based on 16 sub-indicators in five thematic 
areas: eco-innovation inputs, eco-innovation activities, eco-innovation outputs, resource efficiency 
outcomes and socio-economic outcomes. The overall score of an EU MS is calculated by the 
unweighted mean of the 16 sub-indicators.  
2010-2012, 
2013-2016 
C8 Employment incentive Eurostat Labour market policy (LMP) : employment incentives. 2000-2016  
C9 Fertility rate Eurostat Ratio of the number of live births to mothers in their fertility age to the average female population of 
the same age. 
2000-2015 
C10 GDP Growth Eurostat Annual percentage change of real GDP. 2001-2016 
C11 General government 
expenditures on education 
Eurostat Total government expenditures on education as percentage of GDP. 2000-2015 
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Code Label Source Definition Data 
availability 
C12 Government Debt Eurostat Government debt as percentage of GDP. 2000-2016 
C13 Government expenditures on 
health 
Eurostat Total government expenditures on health as percentage of GDP. 2000-2015 
C14 Government expenditures on 
social protection 
Eurostat Government expenditures on social protection as percentage of GDP. Its subcategories are sickness 
and disability 2.8%, old age 10.3%, survivors 1.4%, family and children 1.7%, unemployment 1.3%, 
housing 0.5%, social exclusion n.e.c. 0.8%, R&D social expenditure 0.0%, social protection not 
elsewhere classified (n.e.c.) 0.3%. 
2000-2015 
C15 Government expenditures on 
social protection, excluding 
pension 
Eurostat Government expenditures on social protection as percentage of GDP ( includes all dimensions but 
pensions). 
2000-2015 
C16 Gross Domestic Product Eurostat Real GDP per capita (expenditure approach), purchasing power parity adjusted, in logs.  2000-2016 
C17 Investment share  Eurostat Gross fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP. 2000-2016 
C18 Non-routine cognitive tasks Eurostat Employment rate by type of contract occupation: non –routine cognitive tasks (managers, 
professionals, and technicians and associate professionals –isco08: 1, 2, 3). 
2000-2016 
C19 Non-routine manual tasks  Eurostat Employment rate by type of contract occupation : non-routine manual tasks (service and sales 
workers and elementary occupations –isco08: 5, 9). 
2000-2016 
C20 Out of income maintenance and 
support 
Eurostat Labour market policy (LMP): expenditures on out of income maintenance and support. 2000-2015 
C21 Passive Labour Market Policies Eurostat Government expenditures on labour market policy as log of millions euro of LMP supports : Out-of-
work income maintenance and support, Early retirement.  
2000-2015 
C22 Routine tasks Eurostat Employment rate by type of contract occupation : routine manual tasks (service and sales workers 
and elementary occupations –isco08: 4, 7 and 8). 
2000-2016 
C23 Support to training programmes Eurostat Labour market policy (LMP): expenditures on training. 2000-2015 
C24 Tertiary educational attainment Eurostat Percentage of the total population with a tertiary education aged 25-34. 2000-2015 
C25 Total government expenditures Eurostat Total general government expenditures as a percentage of GDP (COFOG classification). 2000-2015 
C26 Total R&D expenditures  Eurostat Total R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP. 2000-2016 
C27 Unemployment Eurostat Unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force (15-74 years). The labour force is the total 
number of people employed and unemployed.  
2000-2016 
C28 GDP Peak to trough decline Eurostat* Peak to trough decline defined as the percentage difference between the maximum level of real GDP 
in 2007 or 2008 and the level in 2009. 
2000-2016 
C29 Civic Engagement Index  Gallup The Civic Engagement Index assesses respondents’ inclination to volunteer their time and assistance 
to others. It is designed to measure a respondent’s commitment to the community where he or she 
lives. 
2006-2017  
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Code Label Source Definition Data 
availability 
C30 Community Attachment Index  Gallup The Community Attachment Index measures respondents’ satisfaction with the city or area where 
they live and their likelihood to move away or recommend that city or area to a friend. 
2006-2017  
C31 Community Basics Index  Gallup The Community Basics Index evaluates everyday life in a community, including environment, housing 
and infrastructure. Higher values indicate more elevated degree of satisfaction. 
2006-2017  
C32 Ease of finding job Gallup This variable contains the percentage of people who affirm favorable conditions for finding a job. 2006-2017  
C33 Educational system satisfaction Gallup This variable contains a percentage of people that are satisfied with the  educational system or the 
schools. 
2006-2017  
C34 Financial Life Index  Gallup The Financial Life Index measures respondents’ personal economic situations and the economics of 
the community where they live. Higher values of index indicate more people living comfortably on 
their present income. 
2006-2017  
C35 Food and Shelter Index  Gallup The Food and Shelter Index assesses the ability people have to meet basic needs for food and shelter. 
Lower scores on this index indicate that more respondents reported struggling to afford food and 
shelter in the past year, while higher scores indicate fewer respondents reported such struggles. 
2006-2017  
C36 Food security Gallup This variable contains the percentage of people who had enough money for food expenditures.  2006-2017  
C37 Job Climate Index  Gallup The Job Climate Index measures the attitudes about a community’s efforts to provide economic 
opportunities, in particular whether there is a positive perception of economic conditions evolution, or 
favourable conditions to find a job. 
2006-2017  
C38 Living standard evolution Gallup  The variable contains the percentage of people who declare that their living standard is getting better. 2006-2017  
C39 National Institutions Index  Gallup The National Institutions Index reflects citizens’ confidence in key institutions prominent in a country’s 
leadership: the military, the judicial system, the national government and the honesty of elections. 
2006-2017  
C40 Automatic Income stabiliser JRC Level of automatic income stabilization for households in EU countries (see Annex 3 for detailed 
description). 
2014 
C41 Activity rate Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
The activity rate is the percentage of economically active population aged 15-64 on the total 
population of the same age. 
2003-2016 
 
C42 Current account balance Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
Current account provides information about the transactions of a country with the rest of the world. 
It covers all transactions (other than those in financial items) in goods, services, primary income and 
secondary income which occur between resident and non-resident units. Here It is expressed as % of 
GDP and taken as a 3 year average. 
 2007-2016 
C43 Net intl. investment position Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
Net international investment position is based on the difference between an economy’s external 
financial assets and liabilities.It provides an aggregate view of the net financial position (assets minus 
liabilities) of a country vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  It is expressed as % of GDP    
2006-2016  
C44 Export market share Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
Export market share measures the degree of importance of a country within the total exports of the 
region/world. For the calculation at current prices, the market share refers to the world trade (world 
export market share). The indicator is Export market shares (goods and services) - 5 year % change.  
2008-2016  
 43 
 
Code Label Source Definition Data 
availability 
C45 Government gross debt Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
Total gross debt at nominal value at the end of the year and consolidated between and within the 
sectors of general government, as a percentage of GDP. In this context, the stock of government debt 
is equal to the sum of liabilities, at the end of year, of all units classified within the general government 
sector in currency and deposits, debt securities and loans.    
2000-2016  
C46 Real house price index Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
Real house price index is the ratio between the house price index and the national accounts deflator 
for private final consumption expenditures (households and non-profit institutions serving 
households). This indicator therefore measures inflation in the house market relative to inflation in 
the final consumption expenditures of households and NPISHs. The MIP scoreboard indicator is the 
year-on-year growth rate of the deflated house price index. 
2008-2016  
C47 Long term unemployment rate Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
The long-term unemployment rate is the number of persons unemployed for 12 months or longer as 
a percentage of the labour force (i.e. economically active population). The MIP Scoreboard indicator 
is the three years change in percentage points. 
2007-2016  
C48 Net international investment 
position 
Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
Net international investment position is based on the difference between an economy’s external 
financial assets and liabilities. It provides an aggregate view of the net financial position (assets minus 
liabilities) of a country vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  It is expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
2005-2016  
C49 Nominal unit labour cost Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
Nominal unit labour cost is the percentage change over three years of nominal unit labour cost, where 
the unit labour cost is defined as the ratio of labour costs to labour productivity. It is expressed as 3 
years percentage change. 
2003-2017  
C50 Private sector credit flow Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
The private sector credit flow represents the net amount of liabilities in which the sectors non-financial 
corporations and households and non-Profit institutions serving households have incurred along the 
year. Data are presented in consolidated terms, i.e. data do not take into account transactions within 
the same sector and expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
2002-2016  
C51 Private sector debt Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
Private sector debt is the stock of liabilities held by the sectors Non-Financial corporations and 
Households and Non-Profit institutions serving households. The instruments that are taken into 
account to compile private sector debt are Debt securities and Loans. Data are presented in 
consolidated terms, i.e. do not taking into account transactions within the same sector, and expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. 
2001-2016  
C52 Real effective exchange rate Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
Real effective exchange rate aims to assess a country's price or cost competitiveness relative to its 
principal competitors in international markets.  A positive value means real appreciation. The data are 
presented as 3 years percentage change. 
1997-2017  
C53 Total financial sector liabilities Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
The total financial corporations sector liabilities measure the evolution of the sum of all liabilities 
(Currency and deposits, Debt securities, Loans, Equity and investment fund shares, Insurance, 
pensions and standardized guarantees, Financial derivatives and employee stock options and Other 
accounts payable) of the financial corporations sector . Data are presented in non-consolidated terms, 
i.e. data take into account transactions within the same sector. The MIP indicator is expressed as year 
over year growth rate. 
2000-2016  
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Code Label Source Definition Data 
availability 
C54 Unemployment rate  Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force 
(the total number of people employed and unemployed) based on International Labour Office (ILO) 
definition. The MIP scoreboard indicator is the three-year backward moving average. 
2002-2017  
C55 Youth unemployment rate Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure 
The youth unemployment rate is the unemployment rate of people aged 15 - 24 as a percentage of 
the labour force of the same age.  The MIP Scoreboard indicator is the three years change in 
percentage points. 
2003-2017  
C56 Change in Credit-to-GDP Macroeconomic 
Imbalance 
Procedure* 
Change in Credit-to-GDP is measured as non-consolidated private sector credit flow, in percentage 
points in 2009. 
2007-2016  
C57 Budget balance elasticity Mourre at al.  
(2014)* 
Semi-elasticity of the budget balance to the output gap.  2007-2016 
C58 PISA mathematics score OECD Average PISA mathematics score. 2006, 2009, 
2012, 2015 
C59 PISA reading score OECD Average PISA reading score. 2006, 2009, 
2012, 2015 
C60 Employment protection 
legislation 
OECD* The OECD indicator for Employment Protection Legislation refers to individual and collective 
dismissals. Higher values indicated more regulated labour markets. 
  
C61 Product market regulation OECD* The OECD indicator for Product Market Regulation measure the economy-wide regulatory and market 
environments. It has higher values for more restricted product markets. 
1998, 2003,  
2007, 2013 
C62 Ease of doing business  World Bank Overall distance to frontier (DTF) dimensions used : depth of credit information(credit information to 
facilitate lending decisions), private credit coverage, public credit coverage, Procedures required to 
connect to electricity, Time to resolve insolvency, Credit: Strength of legal rights index, Time required 
to start a business , Procedures required to start a business, Time to prepare and pay taxes, Tax 
payments(the total number of taxes and contributions paid by a medium-size business over the course 
of a yea), Total tax rate (measures the amount of taxes payable by medium-size businesses after 
accounting for deductions and exemptions). 
2010, 2011-
2015 
C63 Trade openness  World Bank Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic 
product. 
2000-2016 
C64 Worldwide Governance 
Indicator: Control of corruption 
World Bank Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
(ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). 
2000-2015 
C65 Worldwide Governance 
Indicator: Government 
Effectiveness 
World Bank Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. It ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) 
to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. 
2000-2015 
C66 Worldwide Governance 
Indicator: Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
World Bank Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically‐motivated violence and terrorism. It ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
political stability. 
2000-2015 
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Code Label Source Definition Data 
availability 
C67 Worldwide Governance 
Indicator: Regulatory Quality 
World Bank Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. It ranges from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) regulatory quality. 
2000-2015 
C68 Worldwide Governance 
Indicator: Rule of Law 
World Bank Measure of the perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. It ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 
2.5 (strong) confidence. 
2000-2015 
C69 Worldwide Governance 
Indicator: Voice and 
Accountability 
World Bank Perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  It ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)  participation. 
2000-2016 
C70 Capacity for innovation  World Economic 
Forum 
Perception about the country companies’ capacity to innovate, where higher score represent greater 
extent of innovation perceived.   
2007-2017   
C71 Efficacy of corporate boards  World Economic 
Forum 
Perception about country management being accountable to investors and boards of directors, where 
higher score represent greater extent of accountability perceived.   
2007-2017  
C72 Exports as a percentage of GDP World Economic 
Forum 
Exports of goods and services as a percentage of gross domestic product, where the total exports is 
the sum of total exports of merchandise and commercial services. 
2007-2017  
C73 FDI and technology transfer  World Economic 
Forum 
Perception about the potential of foreign direct investment (FDI) in bringing new technology into the 
country. Higher scores reveal higher extent of perceived potential. 
2007-2017  
C74 Foreign competition  World Economic 
Forum 
 The reported value encompasses the prevalence of non-tariff barriers, trade tariffs, complexity of 
tariffs, efficiency of customs clearance and services trade openness 
2007-2017  
C75 Foreign market size index  World Economic 
Forum 
Value of exports of goods and services, normalized on a 1–7 (best) scale. 2007-2017  
C76 GDP (PPP$ billions) World Economic 
Forum 
Gross domestic product valued at purchasing power parity in billions of international dollars. 2007-2017  
C77 General government debt % 
GDP 
World Economic 
Forum 
Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest and/or principal by 
the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future, expressed as % GDP. 
2007-2017  
C78 Imports as a percentage of GDP World Economic 
Forum 
Total imports is the sum of total imports of merchandise and commercial services, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. 
2007-2017  
C79 Inflation (annual % change) World Economic 
Forum 
Annual percent change in consumer price index (year average). 2007-2017  
C80 Intensity of local competition  World Economic 
Forum 
Perception about the intensity of competition in the local markets? Higher values indicate higher 
intensity of competition perceived.  
2007-2017  
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Code Label Source Definition Data 
availability 
C81 Local supplier quantity  World Economic 
Forum 
Perception about the availability of local suppliers, where higher scores represent more numerous 
local suppliers. 
2007-2017  
C82 Wages-to-productivity  World Economic 
Forum 
Perception about wages being well-related to employee productivity? Higher values indicate better 
correspondence between the wages and productivity. 
2007-2017  
C83 Prevalence of foreign ownership  World Economic 
Forum 
Perception about the prevalence is foreign ownership of companies, where high values indicate higher 
prevalence perceived. 
2007-2017  
C84 Prevalence of trade barriers  World Economic 
Forum 
Perception about the extent in which non-tariff barriers (e.g., health and product standards, technical 
and labeling requirements, etc.) limit the ability of imported goods to compete in the domestic market. 
High values indicate that that non-tariff barriers are not very limiting for the competition. 
2007-2017  
C85 Primary education enrolment  World Economic 
Forum 
The reported value corresponds to the ratio of children of official primary school age (as defined by 
the national education system) who are enrolled in primary school. 
2007-2017  
* Indicators based on European Commission (2017). 
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Annex 3: JRC studies on specific resilience characteristics  
This annex presents results from two complementary JRC studies that help enriching the 
set of candidate characteristics. We first discuss some findings stemming from a study on 
income inequality and employment dynamics in the years of the crisis. The study points to 
the role of different occupation types in resilient behaviour, which motivates one of our 
resilience characteristics (see Section 4.3). The second section presents some results 
derived from an analysis on automatic stabilizers using the EUROMOD model,33 also 
included in the set of candidate characteristics.  
Employment dynamics and the resilience of different groups of workers  
Martinez Turegano and Marschinski (2017) studies the drivers of income inequality and 
employment dynamics in the EU before and after the financial crises. The study provides 
evidence of a heterogeneous impact of shocks across different population groups (see 
Figure 12).  
As one specific finding, the study underlines how the crisis took a heavy toll on 
unemployment in manufacturing and construction sectors, whereas certain service sectors 
remained resilient – health on top of them.  
In addition, 'task-biased technological change' increased the educational level observed in 
jobholders of non-routine cognitive occupations across all sectors. This is compatible with 
a growing demand for non-routine cognitive jobs due to a demand shift to a higher share 
of services ('job polarization'). 
Figure 12 illustrates the percentage change in employment, by type of occupation and 
country, from 2011 to 2016. The graph shows that employment in non-routine cognitive 
occupations presents the highest growth rate for the majority of EU countries. Greece, 
Slovakia, Cyprus and Slovenia are the only MS where the figure is negative.  
 
Figure 12: Change of employment, by type of occupation and country - 2011-2016. Square = Routine 
work, Triangle = Non Routine Manual Work, Diamond = Non Routine Cognitive Work. 
 
 
At the same time, and in line with the conclusions of OECD (2017) for the manufacturing 
sector, some of the countries experiencing the largest increases in this occupational group 
                                           
33  The model was originally developed and maintained by the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) 
at the University of Essex. More recent developments are done in a close collaboration with the JRC. 
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also exhibit high increases in ICT capitalization, including Portugal, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia 
and the United Kingdom. 
Non-routine manual occupation comes second in average employment creation across EU 
countries. Jobs in the category of routine tasks fall for around half of the MS in the sample, 
and show a limited increase in most of the rest.  
In conclusion, routine workers prove to be the group that exhibits the highest vulnerability 
and has shown the least resilience during the period of analysis. This calls for some 
reflection on the need for more targeted socioeconomic policies. 
Prompted by the different experience of the different job categories during the crisis, we 
have also included the share of routine, non-routine manual and non-routine cognitive 
workers in our analysis of resilience characteristics in Section 4.3. In line with the 
preliminary results of Martinez Turegano and Marschinski (2017), a high share of non-
routine manual tasks turns out to be an amplifier of the negative consequences of the crisis 
in the short run. 
 
Increasing resilience to economic shocks: the role of automatic stabilisers  
The interest in automatic stabilisers has been growing since the Great Recession both in 
academic and policy circles. By cushioning the effect of market income shocks on 
disposable income (i.e. income after tax and benefits), fiscal policy instruments act as a 
smoothing factor of the effect of the business cycle on household demand, protecting 
individual and societal well-being, and reinforcing economic growth through improved 
macroeconomic stability. In other words, automatic stabilisers can be seen as an 
instrument to increase resilience, particularly the absorptive capacity (impact). At the same 
time, their ability to facilitate absorption beyond income levels might be less strong. 
Joint Research Centre (2017b) uses the microsimulation model EUROMOD to assess how 
changes in market income affect household disposable income in EU Member States.  
Income stabilization coefficients (ISC) have been computed in the spirit of Dolls et al. 
(2012), measuring the share of a shock to market income that is absorbed by a country’s 
tax and benefit system. A larger coefficient indicates a higher level of stability of household 
resources with respect to changes in its market income. 
Three income stabilisation indicators are computed: 
1) Country Level ISC. It is computed as the difference between the aggregated country-
level variations in household resources in the presence and in the absence of a tax and 
benefit system, as a share of the aggregated change in market income. It provides a single 
coefficient per country.  
2) Household Level ISC. For each household, it measures the cushioning effect of the tax 
and benefit system if all the household members were to experience at once the same 
income shock. The coefficient takes household specific values. 
3) Individual Level ISC. Employing an iterative procedure, it computes the cushioning effect 
of the tax and benefit system on household disposable income if household members would 
experience the shock one at the time. The coefficient takes individual specific values. 
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The values of the ISCs show a high degree of heterogeneity in the stabilisation properties 
of the tax and benefit systems of the Member States. For example, results for 2014 (see 
Figure 13 below) show that the country average of the household level stabilisation 
coefficients varies from around 20% in Bulgaria to around 44% in Austria.  
Based on the decomposition of the ISCs by the source of stabilisation, a major role for 
taxes emerges, followed by social insurance contributions and benefits. The latter suggests 
that fiscal reforms could represent the best channel for promoting greater automatic 
stabilisation of income shocks in the EU.  
The relative importance of taxes changes substantially, however, when focusing on 
households from the poorest quintile of the income distribution (right hand side of Figure 
13). For them, a major share of stabilisation comes from benefits in most Member States. 
Though one would expect that the level of automatic income stabilisation positively 
influenced resilience, none of its variants proved to be a significant explanatory variable in 
our regressions. Further investigations are left for future research. 
 
Figure 13: Level of automatic income stabilisation for households in EU countries (2014) 
 
Source: JRC simulations based on the EUROMOD model. 
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Annex 4: Heat-maps and correlation table for the individual system variables – resilience metrics 
For the impact, the predominant colour is yellow, which shows that the economic–financial crisis hit all countries in some dimensions. There are no countries 
for which the heat-map is entirely green, i.e. each country, at least in a few dimensions, was less resilient than some other countries. At the same time, 
the most resilient countries show high resilience in the majority of the system variables, i.e. their high ranking is not due to an exceptional performance in 
a restricted number of dimensions. Concerning the recovery, the heat-map is red for more countries than those for which it is green, and there are less 
shades of yellow, partly due to the fact that countries with a low impact had very little to recover. The heat-map for the medium-run indicator confirms a 
consistency across the response of the three parts of the system, i.e. assets, engine and outcomes. 
IMPACT 
 
Notes: The heat-map reports standardized scores (i.e. z-scores) for the impact indicator. The colour scheme applied is defined in relation to each column separately. The 
colour scale ranges from red (low resilience) to green (high resilience). Average scores represent the country-specific mean of the indicators constructed on all variables 
available.    
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PL 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 1.0 -2.1 1.1 1.4 -0.1 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.1 1.4 1.7 0.7 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.61
DE 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.7 -0.2 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.6 1.2 0.6 0.0 0.5 -1.0 -1.4 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.2 0.3 1.1 1.5 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.2 0.61
BE 1.0 0.6 0.3 -0.4 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.5 0.5 -0.1 -1.1 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.9 0.45
AT 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.9 -2.0 0.6 0.5 1.2 1.2 0.6 -0.1 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.6 1.1 -0.7 0.7 -0.3 1.0 -0.5 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.44
BG 0.8 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 0.3 -0.6 0.2 0.9 0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.4 -1.5 -2.2 0.1 1.2 1.0 0.5 1.0 -0.9 0.5 1.3 -0.3 1.2 1.1 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.4 3.4 1.3 0.8 -0.1 0.41
LU 0.9 0.8 0.1 1.1 0.5 0.7 -0.5 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.6 -1.7 0.5 2.7 -1.5 0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.9 -0.8 0.7 -0.5 1.1 -0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35
SK 1.1 0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.4 -1.7 -1.0 0.0 0.4 1.5 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 -1.4 1.2 0.4 0.9 -1.4 2.0 1.1 -0.1 0.7 0.7 1.3 -1.4 0.5 0.30
FR 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 -0.1 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.5 -0.6 -0.8 0.7 -0.9 0.6 0.4 0.6 -0.9 0.6 0.30
SE 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -1.3 0.7 1.3 0.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.3 0.6 -0.2 -1.8 -0.4 0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.7 0.8 -0.7 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 -0.9 0.6 -0.3 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.29
FI 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.9 1.1 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.9 1.1 0.0 -0.6 0.4 0.6 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -0.2 -1.6 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.7 -0.7 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.25
NL 0.0 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 -0.5 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.3 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.2 0.6 0.3 -0.3 -0.5 0.5 0.25
HU -0.3 -2.8 -1.2 0.2 1.1 0.4 -0.6 1.2 0.8 -0.2 -0.5 0.9 1.6 3.1 0.8 -0.5 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4 -1.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.9 2.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.1 -0.9 -0.2 0.8 0.4 0.23
MT 0.6 0.2 -0.8 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.7 -0.9 0.0 0.1 -0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.7 -0.2 -0.3 1.1 1.0 -0.6 -1.5 0.6 0.0 1.6 -0.6 -0.3 1.0 0.21
CZ 0.3 0.6 0.4 -1.7 -1.6 0.8 -1.1 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.0 1.2 0.7 -0.8 0.6 0.4 0.1 -0.8 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.6 -1.5 -0.2 0.9 1.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 -0.2 0.7 0.19
UK -0.8 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.1 -0.9 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.6 -1.4 0.6 0.2 0.7 -1.8 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.6 0.8 0.6 0.09
IT 0.8 -1.8 -0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.9 -0.5 -0.7 0.8 -0.1 0.03
PT -0.9 -1.4 -1.1 -0.4 0.5 -0.5 2.2 -0.1 -1.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 1.1 0.3 -0.4 1.8 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 0.8 -0.3 0.00
RO -2.6 2.6 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.4 -2.1 -0.5 -2.4 -1.8 1.8 0.6 0.3 -1.7 -0.3 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.9 -1.2 0.4 0.2 0.9 -0.4 1.2 0.0 0.2 0.9 -0.01
DK -0.3 -0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.6 -0.6 -0.1 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.2 -1.1 0.1 -4.1 0.0 0.9 0.5 -1.1 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.9 0.3 -1.5 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.4 -0.03
SI 0.6 0.2 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 0.7 -1.3 -1.2 0.4 -0.2 -1.1 -1.1 0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -1.3 0.3 0.2 1.5 -0.6 0.9 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.5 0.4 -0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 0.1 -0.16
HR -0.5 0.2 2.6 1.5 0.0 -1.5 0.4 -0.7 0.2 -0.3 0.6 0.5 -0.5 -1.4 0.7 -1.3 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -3.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.5 -0.9 -0.2 -1.1 0.6 0.9 -0.3 -0.20
ES 0.2 0.4 -0.4 0.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.9 -1.4 -0.9 -1.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.6 -0.3 0.5 1.7 0.1 -1.6 -0.2 -0.2 1.1 -0.8 -1.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -1.2 -2.2 -0.28
EE -0.2 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.4 -1.2 -1.0 0.4 1.1 -0.2 -1.5 0.7 0.6 -1.1 -0.9 2.0 -0.3 -1.0 -0.2 0.6 0.0 -0.2 1.6 -1.4 -1.9 -0.5 -0.2 -2.0 -0.9 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 -1.1 -1.2 -0.29
LT -0.4 1.4 0.6 -0.8 -0.1 0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -2.1 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.6 -0.9 0.0 1.2 -0.3 -1.0 -0.8 0.1 -1.3 -1.4 -1.8 -0.9 -0.8 -0.3 0.8 -1.4 -0.32
IE -2.2 0.7 0.7 -1.1 -0.7 -0.6 -1.2 -4.3 -2.7 -1.9 -1.7 -0.6 0.5 -0.3 0.9 1.3 0.2 -0.1 -2.9 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 0.8 -1.4 -0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.9 -1.7 -1.3 0.4 0.2 -0.8 -0.54
LV -3.1 -0.2 -1.4 -1.6 -0.2 -0.3 -1.8 -1.5 -2.1 -1.2 0.5 -2.0 -0.1 -0.3 -2.9 0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -1.6 -2.1 -0.1 0.6 -2.2 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -1.1 0.8 -1.4 -0.97
CY 0.5 0.1 -0.7 -2.3 -3.0 -1.8 0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -2.7 0.0 -2.5 -3.2 -0.7 1.8 -1.0 0.3 0.7 -2.6 0.2 -4.4 -1.7 -2.7 -1.3 0.0 -0.8 -0.4 0.2 -1.3 -2.2 -0.4 -2.2 -1.4 -1.2 -1.10
EL -0.7 -0.4 -3.4 1.0 0.7 -2.9 0.1 -0.2 -1.9 -0.5 -1.2 -1.5 -1.2 0.0 0.6 0.3 -2.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -1.5 0.3 -2.2 -2.0 -3.1 -3.2 -0.5 -2.4 0.0 -1.9 -1.5 -3.0 -3.2 -2.4 -1.21
Country
ASSET ENGINE OUTCOME
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RECOVERY 
 
Notes: The heat-map reports standardized scores (i.e. z-scores) for the recovery indicator. The colour scheme applied is defined in relation to each column 
separately. The colour scale ranges from red (low resilience) to green (high resilience). Average scores represent the country-specific mean of the indicators 
constructed on all variables available.   
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LV 3.6 0.0 -0.9 -0.2 0.4 0.3 1.4 0.5 3.3 0.4 -0.2 1.0 -0.2 1.7 -0.6 1.1 3.2 2.2 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.2 1.6 2.2 2.3 2.5 1.2 -0.7 2.1 1.05
IE -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.1 4.1 0.5 4.2 4.6 1.0 1.5 1.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 1.1 3.6 -0.9 -1.1 -0.2 1.1 1.4 -0.1 0.6 3.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 1.0 2.1 0.7 -0.5 0.2 1.1 0.87
EE -0.1 -0.9 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.7 -0.4 1.5 2.1 -0.6 -0.3 1.9 2.4 2.7 0.3 1.3 1.2 -0.6 2.0 0.3 0.7 1.6 0.8 0.6 -0.8 1.8 0.0 1.6 -0.3 0.5 0.5 2.1 0.62
BG 1.5 2.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -1.0 1.6 0.8 2.2 1.0 -0.7 0.3 2.1 0.1 1.0 3.2 0.1 -0.1 3.4 0.4 0.3 -1.2 0.5 2.1 1.3 2.2 0.6 0.57
MT -0.8 2.0 1.7 1.8 -0.3 0.9 -1.1 -0.1 -0.2 2.2 -0.6 0.3 3.9 1.1 1.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 1.9 1.9 1.3 0.4 1.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 0.3 -0.5 0.55
LT 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 0.1 0.8 -0.8 0.4 -0.3 0.6 0.1 2.7 2.7 2.0 -0.9 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.6 -0.5 1.4 0.2 1.1 2.0 0.9 -0.5 -0.8 2.2 -1.2 0.6 0.8 1.7 0.1 2.1 0.54
HU -0.8 0.5 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -0.5 0.2 0.7 1.3 2.5 -0.2 0.1 1.6 -1.1 0.1 -0.9 1.4 0.1 1.0 1.0 -0.1 2.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -1.2 1.1 1.5 -0.4 1.8 0.8 0.22
SK -0.7 2.1 1.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 2.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 -0.7 0.1 -0.8 0.5 1.5 -1.1 2.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 0.2 0.7 -0.5 1.6 -0.6 1.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.7 -0.7 0.4 0.21
SE 1.8 0.1 0.1 1.8 1.4 0.5 1.0 -0.8 -0.1 0.0 2.3 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 0.3 -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 0.6 -0.1 -0.4 0.8 -0.5 0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 0.09
UK 0.7 -0.8 0.6 1.5 0.1 0.2 -0.8 0.0 -0.5 0.7 0.3 0.0 1.8 -0.3 0.5 0.5 -0.9 0.1 0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.8 0.0 0.7 0.3 -0.5 -0.6 0.3 -0.1 0.05
PL 0.2 0.5 1.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 0.7 -0.3 -0.4 -1.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 1.1 -0.4 -1.1 2.5 0.2 -0.2 0.8 0.1 1.1 -0.5 -0.2 1.3 -0.2 -0.6 1.7 1.1 -0.3 0.1 0.04
RO 0.0 0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 0.3 -1.2 -1.1 1.6 -0.6 0.0 0.5 0.8 -0.8 1.4 -0.5 0.3 -0.5 -0.6 1.7 -1.2 -1.2 1.6 3.1 -0.7 -0.8 0.02
DE 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 2.2 -0.1 -0.8 -0.3 0.9 -0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 -0.6 -1.2 -1.1 -0.4 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.8 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.8 -0.4 0.4 -0.3 -0.7 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.01
LU 0.7 1.8 0.7 0.3 -0.8 -0.1 -0.9 1.0 -0.7 0.0 0.1 -0.8 -0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.1 0.6 -0.5 -0.8 1.1 -0.1 -0.8 0.6 0.6 -1.1 -0.8 -0.4 -1.2 -0.10
PT -0.5 -1.1 -1.4 2.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.8 0.4 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 1.2 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 1.3 -1.1 -1.5 -0.9 -0.8 0.2 -1.0 1.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 0.5 -0.6 -0.5 2.4 0.5 -0.13
CZ -0.8 0.1 0.3 -0.8 -0.7 -0.4 -0.8 -0.1 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 1.5 0.3 0.9 -0.5 -0.2 1.0 -0.8 0.7 -1.3 -0.6 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -1.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.3 -0.7 -0.1 -0.15
DK 0.3 1.0 -0.2 0.6 1.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 0.4 -0.7 0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -0.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 0.2 -0.9 1.8 -0.9 -0.2 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 1.8 -1.1 -0.7 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.20
ES -1.0 -1.4 1.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.8 -0.1 -0.4 0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.1 -0.6 -1.0 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 2.3 -1.1 -1.1 1.5 -0.8 0.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -1.2 0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.7 1.0 -0.24
SI -0.8 -1.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 0.2 1.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 -0.6 0.0 -0.3 1.4 1.1 -0.3 -0.6 1.1 -0.3 -1.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 1.4 -0.8 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 -0.26
CY -0.8 -1.1 -1.4 -0.8 -0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 -0.5 3.4 -1.0 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 0.0 1.1 -0.6 0.1 -1.1 -0.2 -1.5 1.3 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -0.5 1.4 -0.8 -0.2 0.1 -1.0 -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 -0.28
AT 0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 -0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -0.7 1.5 -0.6 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2 -0.7 0.1 -0.4 -0.9 0.1 -1.0 -0.5 2.4 -0.4 -1.0 0.7 -1.3 -0.1 -1.2 2.4 -1.2 -0.28
BE 0.0 0.9 1.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 1.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 0.2 0.1 -0.8 -1.0 -0.8 0.7 -1.0 0.4 0.2 -0.9 -0.7 -1.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 0.8 0.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -1.0 -0.32
FR -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 1.1 1.8 -0.6 1.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -1.1 -0.6 0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 -1.1 -0.7 -0.4 -0.9 0.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.6 -1.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -1.1 -0.33
HR -1.1 -0.9 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 -1.0 -0.3 -1.0 -0.8 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -1.0 -0.9 -0.6 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5 3.6 -1.0 0.7 0.0 0.4 -1.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.33
NL -0.8 -0.4 0.7 -0.8 -0.8 0.0 -0.8 -0.2 0.1 0.6 -0.5 -0.6 0.3 -0.7 -1.2 0.7 -0.7 -0.4 -0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.7 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -1.0 0.1 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 0.0 -0.8 -0.39
FI 0.2 -0.6 0.4 0.0 1.9 -0.6 0.4 -0.9 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -0.6 -1.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -0.3 -0.9 -1.3 0.2 -0.9 -0.8 -1.3 -1.0 -0.5 1.1 -0.1 0.2 -1.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.7 -1.0 -0.44
EL -0.8 -1.1 -1.4 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 1.5 -0.5 -0.8 -1.2 -0.6 -1.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.7 -1.3 -0.2 -0.6 0.3 -1.4 0.0 -1.0 -0.4 -1.4 -0.5 -0.5 -1.3 -0.8 1.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 0.1 -0.58
IT -0.4 -1.1 -1.3 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.6 -1.2 -0.7 -1.2 1.3 -1.0 -0.3 -0.6 -1.0 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -1.2 -0.5 0.0 -1.1 -1.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 -0.9 -0.70
Country
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MEDIUM-RUN 
 
Notes: The heat-map reports standardized scores (i.e. z-scores) for the medium-run indicator. The colour scheme applied is defined in relation to each 
column separately. The colour scale ranges from red (low resilience) to green (high resilience). Average scores represent the country-specific mean of the 
indicators constructed on all variables available.   
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MT 0.2 1.4 0.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.8 -0.4 0.3 3.3 0.6 0.8 0.4 -0.4 -0.3 2.3 1.9 0.2 -0.9 1.2 -0.3 1.7 -0.6 0.0 0.9 0.70
BG 1.5 1.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 -0.8 -0.1 0.7 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.0 1.2 -1.1 1.6 1.2 -0.2 0.6 2.0 -0.7 0.8 2.9 -0.2 0.6 2.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.8 3.5 1.7 1.9 0.3 0.68
PL 0.4 0.8 0.7 -0.5 -0.3 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.6 0.4 -1.6 1.3 0.4 -0.6 2.3 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.4 1.6 0.3 0.0 2.1 1.5 0.5 1.9 1.4 0.2 1.3 0.54
DE 0.7 0.5 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.4 1.1 1.9 1.2 0.8 0.2 -0.5 -1.6 -1.4 -0.3 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.0 1.2 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.8 1.4 0.0 0.6 0.5 1.5 0.53
SK 0.8 1.6 0.8 -0.4 0.3 0.3 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.4 -1.6 -1.2 -1.0 0.4 0.1 0.7 1.5 -0.4 2.1 0.1 -1.4 1.0 0.5 1.0 -1.3 2.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.3 -1.2 0.9 0.36
SE 1.5 0.2 0.2 1.2 -0.4 0.9 1.4 -0.6 1.2 1.4 2.1 1.1 0.9 -0.1 0.1 -1.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.8 0.6 -0.6 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 1.1 -1.1 0.9 -0.5 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.33
HU -0.9 -1.4 -1.3 -0.3 0.7 -0.2 -0.8 1.3 0.9 0.1 0.1 2.1 1.3 2.2 1.7 -1.0 0.3 -0.8 0.7 0.3 0.7 -0.6 0.2 1.9 -0.1 0.4 1.9 -0.6 -1.2 0.6 0.1 -0.4 1.7 1.0 0.31
LU 1.5 1.7 0.4 1.1 -0.7 0.7 -0.9 1.5 -0.5 0.5 0.4 -1.2 -0.2 2.0 -1.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.9 0.6 -1.0 1.0 -0.3 0.6 -0.6 0.1 0.0 0.22
BE 1.1 1.0 0.7 -0.8 -0.2 0.6 0.4 -0.7 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.5 -0.6 0.6 -1.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4 0.4 0.18
AT 1.0 0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.6 -2.1 0.2 0.4 1.2 1.7 0.3 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 2.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.4 -0.5 2.0 0.2 0.18
CZ -0.2 0.4 0.4 -1.9 -1.6 0.4 -1.3 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3 -0.1 1.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 -0.2 0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.0 0.3 -1.4 -0.2 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.7 -0.6 0.8 0.16
EE -0.3 -0.5 0.6 0.0 0.3 -0.8 -1.1 -0.6 1.0 0.3 -0.4 0.4 0.4 1.8 1.0 2.8 0.1 0.6 0.4 -0.1 0.9 -0.1 1.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8 0.3 -0.5 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.15
UK -0.4 -0.5 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.4 -0.6 0.1 -0.9 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.3 -0.3 1.0 0.5 -0.8 -0.4 0.5 -0.3 0.6 0.4 -1.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 -1.8 0.2 0.8 0.9 -0.3 -0.8 0.6 0.6 0.12
LT -0.3 0.6 0.2 -0.2 0.6 0.2 -0.5 -0.8 1.3 -0.1 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.8 -0.8 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.1 -0.1 -1.5 0.2 -2.2 -0.6 -0.2 0.8 0.5 -0.3 0.07
FR 0.8 -0.1 0.0 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.6 -0.1 -0.2 0.8 0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.6 -0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -0.9 0.2 -0.6 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.9 0.0 0.03
RO -1.6 1.9 -0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.7 -2.2 0.1 -2.7 -1.7 2.0 -0.3 0.3 -0.5 0.1 0.5 1.4 0.3 0.8 -1.1 0.0 1.3 0.3 -1.4 1.7 1.9 -0.4 0.6 0.03
NL -0.6 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.3 -0.6 -0.7 0.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 1.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.1 -0.03
IE -2.6 0.6 0.5 -0.3 -0.5 2.1 -1.1 -0.1 -1.1 -2.0 -0.9 0.2 0.5 -0.5 0.6 1.4 3.2 -0.9 -2.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.8 2.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 1.3 -0.5 -0.6 0.0 0.3 -0.3 -0.05
FI 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.8 2.0 0.1 0.0 -2.1 -0.1 0.8 0.5 -0.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 -0.9 -0.4 -0.6 -1.7 0.3 0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.9 -0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.07
PT -1.3 -1.6 -1.4 1.2 0.4 -0.8 1.9 0.6 -1.6 -0.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 -1.0 -0.5 -0.8 1.6 -0.1 -0.7 1.5 0.7 -0.4 -0.4 2.1 0.0 -0.08
LV -1.3 -0.2 -1.4 -1.4 0.4 -0.2 -1.7 -1.1 3.0 -0.6 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.6 -1.8 0.7 0.6 1.4 -0.5 -0.8 0.1 0.6 -0.9 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.10
DK -0.1 0.6 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 -0.1 -1.8 0.8 -1.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 -0.7 0.1 -0.9 -0.3 -3.1 0.1 -0.2 1.1 -1.4 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3 0.3 -0.5 -0.1 -0.20
SI 0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -0.8 -1.0 0.7 -0.4 -1.3 0.4 -0.5 -1.1 -0.8 0.0 0.6 0.6 -0.7 -0.4 0.7 0.5 -0.8 0.7 -0.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 1.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.9 -0.2 -0.26
IT 0.6 -1.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 0.6 -0.4 -0.8 -1.0 1.1 -0.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -1.1 -0.1 0.3 -1.0 -0.2 -1.2 -0.6 -0.9 0.3 -0.8 -0.40
ES -0.5 -0.4 0.6 0.2 -0.7 -0.3 -1.9 -1.7 -0.9 -1.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.6 -0.9 0.6 0.2 -0.3 1.5 -1.0 0.0 2.2 -0.6 -1.4 -0.6 -0.4 0.9 -1.0 -2.1 -0.7 -1.1 -0.6 -1.1 -2.2 -0.49
HR -1.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.8 -0.9 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 -1.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.8 -0.5 -3.4 -0.7 -0.6 -1.0 0.1 -1.5 0.1 -1.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.61
CY 0.0 -0.6 -1.1 -2.4 -2.9 -1.0 0.9 -0.7 -1.2 -2.0 -0.5 -2.3 -2.9 -1.3 1.4 0.3 -0.4 0.5 -2.4 0.0 -4.0 -1.2 -1.7 -1.8 -0.7 -0.9 0.6 -0.3 -1.4 -2.6 -0.8 -2.0 -1.2 -1.7 -1.12
EL -1.3 -1.0 -3.0 0.3 0.3 -3.0 -0.1 2.7 -2.2 -1.0 -1.6 -1.5 -1.4 -0.3 0.6 -0.3 -1.8 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 -1.7 0.3 -1.6 -2.2 -2.8 -2.6 -0.6 -3.0 -0.3 -1.5 -1.5 -2.5 -2.1 -3.1 -1.19
Country
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CORRELATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL METRICS AND THE CORRESPONDING INDICATORS 
Overall, there is a relatively high correlation between individual metrics and the corresponding aggregate indicators. However, some variables (mostly in 
the social domain, often coming from surveys) exhibit only a modest correlation for all metrics (both at the system and at the core level). The case of 
corporate loans is particular: the impact of the crisis on its dynamic behaviour is particularly strong, but apparently, it differs from the general crisis impact 
on most other variables. This finding is interesting even in itself, as it suggests that Member States differed in the degree they managed to insulate their 
economies (and society at large) from adverse credit market developments. It also reinforces the case for the system view, as different parts of the system 
may be strongly hit by the crisis yet behave differently, thus adding extra information to the overall picture. 
It is worth highlighting that investment (for the impact), employment, GDP, and unemployment exhibit a consistently high correlation across the board. At 
the same time, bivariate scatterplots would reveal that there is still a substantial difference between the aggregate measures and any of these individual 
metrics. 
 
 
 
Notes. The “System” row of the table reports the correlation between the different metrics of each individual system variable and the corresponding 
resilience indicator. The “Core” row reports the correlation with a narrow resilience indicator, where the individual metrics are averaged only for the core 
economic and financial variables. Green indicates a correlation exceeding 0.5. Bold indicates the highest correlation value per row.
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Annex 5: Graphs on the resilience indicators 
Figure 14 presents bar charts of the impact, recovery and medium-run indicators, 
respectively. Countries are ranked from the least resilient (left) to the most resilient (right). 
The main purpose of this graph is to compare the resilience indicators computed on the 
complete set of variables (bars), with the resilience of its sub-components: core-economic 
(triangles), assets (squares), engine (diamonds) and outcomes (circles). In general, these 
graphs confirm that countries that are the most (least) resilient in one dimension tend to 
be the most (least) resilient in all dimensions, though some differences emerge. For 
example, as far as the impact is concerned, HU ranks above average in terms of all 
dimension but assets, while the opposite is true for HR. Moreover, resilience indicators built 
on the assets show a higher dispersion. 
Countries on the right hand side were impacted less compared to the others. The recovery 
metrics for these Member States is more difficult to be interpreted, since one could have a 
low recovery as a consequence of having experienced a weak impact. For this reason, 
looking at the medium-term impact (bottom chart) is more informative. The most resilient 
countries over the medium-run turn are Malta, Bulgaria, Poland and Germany. 
 
Figure 14: Resilience indicators for the full system and its main ingredients. Top panel: Impact; 
medium panel: recovery; bottom panel: medium run.  
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Figure 15 compares the impact, recovery and medium-run performance indicators 
calculated only for the core–economic variables (x-axis) vs those computed by taking a full 
system view (y-axis). 
 
Figure 15: Comparison between the system view and the core-economic view. 
  
 
 
Figure 16 shows which variables are responsible for the different resilience performance 
once the analysis is broadened from a core-economic focus to a full system view. The 
analysis keeps the core-economic variables fixed while adding the more social variables 
one at a time. The points in the chart correspond to the value of the aggregate resilience 
indicator, computed on the set of core-economic variables plus the one extra variable of 
interest. The outer circle indicates the largest distance from the indicator based on the core 
set while the inner circle is its half. The five variables that are able to change the final 
resilience score most significantly are highlighted. 
 57 
 
Figure 16: Comparison between the resilience indicators (impact and recovery) in the core-economic 
setting and the system view, for selected countries. The indicated variables are those responsible for 
the largest changes in the value of the aggregate indicators between the two settings.  
  
   
The variables indicated on the figure are the following. 
UK: v2 – Dwellings, v7 – Fairness, v12 – Health, v31 – Trust in legal system, v34 – Wages. 
BE: v4 – Expenditures on education, v5 – Expenditures on health, v7 – Fairness, v17 – Inequality, v26 
– Social activity. 
HU: v4 – Expenditures on education, v5 – Expenditures on health, v12 – Health, v17 – Inequality, v30 
– Trust in the European Parliament. 
BG: v5 – Expenditures on health, v11 – Happiness, v21 – Active labour market policies, v27 – Social 
exclusion, v34 – Wages. 
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Figure 17: Comparison between the bouncing forward and the impact and medium run indicators.  
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Annex 6: Heat-map based on the bouncing forward indicator 
 
Notes: The bouncing forward analysis captures the medium-run impact of the crisis relative to the pre-crisis situation, taking into account the observed pre-crisis volatility for 
each dimension. The pre-crisis volatility of a variable is defined as the standard (root-mean-square) deviation of its observed values around an HP-filtered trend during the 
2000-2007 period. The heat-map is to be read as follows: 1) if the medium-run impact on the relevant variable is positive and larger than its pre-crisis volatility (i.e. “bouncing 
forward”), the cell is denoted by ↗ and coloured in green, 2) if the medium-run impact on the relevant variable is smaller (in absolute terms) than its pre-crisis volatility (i.e. 
“just recovering”), the cell is denoted by → and coloured in yellow, 3) if the medium-run impact on the relevant variable is negative and larger in magnitude than its pre-crisis 
volatility (i.e. “still to recover”), the cell is denoted by ↘ and coloured in red.  
Average scores by country and variable are calculated as the simple mean of the relevant cross-section, whereby cases of “bouncing forward”, “just recovering”, and “still to 
recover” are assigned the values of +1,0, and -1, respectively. The share of forward bounces per variable is calculated as the number of forward bounces divided by the 
number of countries for which data is available for that specific variable. Similarly, the share of forward bounces per country is calculated as the number of forward bounces 
divided by the number of variables for which data is available for that specific country. Total averages for both summary indicators (bottom right corner) correspond to the 
mean of the respective country scores. 
Bouncing forward information is missing for corporate loans, as loan dynamics could not be defined consistently for the pre-, during and post-crisis period.  
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Annex 7: Detailed results for the analysis of resilience characteristics 
Impact of the crisis: univariate regressions 
Var 
code 
Variables Adjusted R2 Coefficient Significance 
level 
C14 Expenditures on social protection (00-07) 0.30 0.07*** 0.00 
C48 Unit labour cost growth (05-07) 0.29 -0.03*** 0.00 
C43 Net int’l. investment position (05-07) 0.26 0.007*** 0.00 
C42 Current account balance (05-07) 0.25 0.04*** 0.00 
C74 Foreign market size (2007) 0.24 0.29*** 0.00 
C69 Innovation capacity (2007) 0.22 0.24*** 0.01 
C81 Quantity of local suppliers (2007) 0.19 0.44** 0.01 
C17 Investment per GDP (05-07) 0.19 -0.05** 0.01 
C19 Non routine manual tasks (00-07) 0.19 -6.37** 0.01 
C4 Gender Equality Index (2005) 0.12 0.02** 0.04 
Impact of the crisis: bivariate regressions 
Var 
code 
Variables Adjusted R2 Coefficient Significance 
level 
C42 Current account balance (05-07) 0.52 0.09*** 0.00 
C16 GDP per capita (05-07) -0.99*** 0.00 
C15 Expenditures on social protection (00-07) 0.46 0.10*** 0.00 
C51 Real effective exchange rate (00-07) 0.05*** 0.01 
C48 Unit labour cost growth (05-07) 0.44 -0.04*** 0.00 
C44 Export market share - 5 year % change 
(05-07) 
0.008*** 0.01 
C14 Expenditures on social protection (00-07) 0.37 0.05** 0.03 
C43 Net int’l. investment position (05-07) 0.005* 0.06 
C14 Expenditures on social protection (00-07) 0.35 0.04* 0.07 
C48 Unit labour cost growth (05-07) -0.02* 0.10 
C14 Expenditures on social protection (00-07) 0.30 0.05* 0.10 
C42 Current account balance (05-07) 0.02 0.35 
C19 Non routine manual tasks (00-07) 0.35 -3.97 0.10 
C14 Expenditures on social protection (00-07) 0.05** 0.01 
*** means the variable is significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10% 
The univariate specifications are the best eight of the meaningful ones, followed by selected 
interesting findings (marked by gray). The bivariate specifications are the best three of the 
meaningful pairs, followed by some selected interesting findings (marked by gray). 
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Recovery from the crisis: univariate regressions 
Var 
code 
Variables Adjusted R2 Coefficient Significance level 
C10 GDP growth (00-07) 0.46 0.15*** 0.00 
C44 Export market share - 5 year % change (00-07) 0.40 0.098*** 0.00 
C52 Financial sector liabilities (06-07) 0.39 0.03*** 0.00 
C79 Inflation (08-10) 0.35 0.13*** 0.00 
C76 Government debt (05-07) 0.31 0.31** 0.00 
Recovery from the crisis: bivariate regressions 
Var 
code 
Variables Adjusted R2 Coefficient Significance level 
C10 GDP growth (00-07) 0.72 0.18*** 0.00 
C61 Ease of doing business index (2010) 0.02*** 0.00 
C79 Inflation (08-10) 0.67 0.17*** 0.00 
C72 FDI generating technology transfer (08-10) 0.47*** 0.00 
C44 Export market share - 5 year % change (00-07) 0.65 0.012*** 0.00 
C61 Ease of doing business index (2010) 0.03*** 0.00 
*** means the variable is significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10% 
The univariate specifications are the best five of the meaningful ones. The bivariate specifications 
are selected from the best five of the meaningful pairs, showing some interesting findings. 
Medium-run: univariate regressions 
Var 
code 
Variables Adjusted R2 Coefficient Significance 
level 
C65 Political stability (08-10) 0.18 0.50** 0.01 
C82 Wages related to productivity (08-10) 0.17 0.42** 0.02 
C52 Financial sector liabilities (08-10) 0.14 -0.02** 0.03 
C43 Net int’l. investment position (05-07) 0.14 0.005** 0.03 
C78 Imports per GDP (2007) 0.13 0.007** 0.04 
C72 FDI generating technology transfer (08-10) 0.13 0.33** 0.04 
C70 Efficacy of corporate boards (08-10) 0.12 0.35** 0.04 
C62 Trade openness (08-10) 0.12 0.003** 0.04 
Medium-run: bivariate regressions 
Var 
code 
Variables Adjusted R2 Coefficient Significance 
level 
C43 Net int’l investment position (05-07) 0.38 0.008*** 0.00 
C44 Export market share - 5 year % change (05-07) 0.009*** 0.00 
C52 Financial sector liabilities (08-10) 0.37 -0.03*** 0.00 
C10 GDP growth (08-10) 0.11*** 0.00 
C43 Net int’l investment position (05-07) 0.37 0.008*** 0.00 
C51 Real effective exchange rate (00-07) 0.05*** 0.00 
C65 Political stability (08-10) 0.34 0.50*** 0.01 
C52 Financial sector liabilities (08-10) -0.02** 0.01 
C52 Financial sector liabilities (08-10) 0.33 -0.03*** 0.00 
C77 Trust in the financial system (08-10) 0.47*** 0.01 
C65 Political stability(08-10) 0.30 0.68*** 0.00 
C16 GDP per capita (05-07) -0.43** 0.03 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10% 
The univariate specifications are the best eight of the meaningful ones. The bivariate specifications 
are the best three of the meaningful pairs, followed by some selected interesting findings (marked 
by gray). 
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Bouncing forward: univariate regressions 
Var 
code 
Variables Adjusted R2 Coefficient Significance level 
C81 Wages related to productivity (08-10) 0.28 0.32*** 0.00 
C69 Efficacy of corporate boards (08-10) 0.22 0.27*** 0.01 
C79 Intensity of local competition (08-10) 0.18 0.28** 0.01 
C71 FDI generating technology transfer (08- 
10) 0.17 0.23** 0.02 
C82 Prevalence of foreign ownership (08-10) 0.16 0.19** 0.02 
C76 Trust in the financial system (08-10) 0.15 0.26** 0.02 
C64 Political stability (2008-2010) 0.14 0.28** 0.03 
C42 Net int’l investment position (05-07) 0.14 0.003** 0.03 
C60 Ease of doing business index (2010) 0.10 0.01* 0.06 
Bouncing forward: bivariate regressions 
Var 
code 
Variables Adjusted R2 Coefficient Significance level 
C79 Intensity of local competition (08-10) 0.49 0.40*** 0.00 
C43 Export market share - 5 year % change (08-10) 0.007*** 0.00 
C69 Efficacy of corporate boards (08-10) 0.46 0.33*** 0.00 
C43 Export market share - 5 year % change (08-10) 0.006*** 0.00 
C81 Wages related to productivity (08-10) 0.46 0.34*** 0.00 
C42 Net int’l investment position (05-07) 0.004*** 0.00 
C64 Political stability (2008-2010) 0.34 0.20* 0.08 
C81 Wages related to productivity (08-10) 0.28*** 0.01 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10% 
The univariate specifications are the best eight of the meaningful ones, followed by a selected 
interesting finding (marked by gray). The bivariate specifications are the best three of the meaningful 
pairs, followed by some selected interesting findings. 
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Annex 8: The importance of expenditures on social protection 
That government expenditures on social protection are a source of socio-economic 
resilience of a country or community is an intriguing finding on several counts. First, it 
squares with the growing post-crisis consensus that raising social standards and 
institutionalizing social protection may be indispensable for social stability and sustainable 
development. This was one of the key arguments for the recently introduced European 
Pillar of Social Rights. Similar ideas are advocated by the OECD's "Inclusive Growth" or 
"Growth-Fragility" frameworks in relation to a wide range of socio-economic indicators. 
Given the mounting empirical evidence that income inequality, especially inequality at the 
bottom, hampers economic performance (Cingano, 2014; Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides, 
2014), the case for making expenditures on social protection a more efficient and endemic 
policy tool is much warranted.  
Secondly, and more importantly, our finding suggest that exploring the role of a strong 
welfare state (high level of expenditures on social protection) in coping with economic 
turbulences is of prime importance. Unfortunately, this is an area of research that has not 
garnered enough attention in the past, either within or outside the European Union. To our 
best knowledge, the only paper that studied the empirical link between social protection 
and economic performance from a decidedly resilience perspective is by Roca and Ferrer 
(2016), who find that higher levels of expenditures on social protection by the government 
were positively associated with growth performance during the recent crisis episode in 16 
developing countries. Replicating their result in a methodologically sound fashion in the 
context of the EU would therefore be an important contribution.    
The third rationale for studying the link between expenditures on social protection and 
economic resilience stems from the complexity and multitude of potential configurations 
and transmission channels. For example, various studies have shown that not only the 
level, but also the composition of expenditures on social protection may matter for 
economic performance: Arjona et al. (2002) find that only "active" spending is associated 
with higher growth, Alesina et al. (2017) establish that transfer payments may have a 
different effect on output than non-transfer expenditures, while Johansson (2016) shows 
that transfers need to be combined with an adequate tax structure to be effective. Our 
understanding is also very limited regarding the main functions of expenditures on social 
protection: as Fan & Rao (2003) shows for a set of developing countries, certain types of 
expenditures (e.g. health, education) are likely to contribute more to economic growth 
than others, and that this may change from country to country. Identifying the most 
effective channels of social protection during the European crisis episode is therefore a 
commendable policy objective.
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